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UPDATING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff* 
Exactly ohe year after Appomattox and less than five months after 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. A century later, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 1 
the Supreme Court held that section 19822 - which it traced to sec-
tion 1 of the 1866 Act - protected blacks against discrimination in 
the sale of private property. In 1976, in Runyon v. McCrary, 3 the 
Court considered whether section 1981's4 guarantee of equal rights "to 
make and enforce contracts" also applied to acts of private discrimina-
tion. At issue in Runyon were private schools that denied admission 
to blacks. Over a powerful dissent, a majority of the Court concluded 
that section 1981 derived from the same section of the 1866 Act as 
section 1982; thus Jones controlled, and section 1981 was construed to 
apply to private discrimination. Runyon represented an important vic-
tory in the continuing struggle against segregated schools, and it has 
had a significant impact in other areas of private discrimination as 
well. 
Last Term the Supreme Court, sua sponte, ordered reargument in 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a case alleging discrimination in a 
private employment relationship. The Court requested the parties to 
brief and argue "[w]hether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, ... should be 
reconsidered."5 Patterson is a case of singular importance, not only 
for its potential impact on civil rights law, but also because of the 
significant issues it raises for theories of statutory interpretation. 
Some of those theoretical issues are adumbrated in Justice Stevens' 
separate opinion in Runyon. Unlike the majority, Stevens expressed 
his "firm" conviction "that Jones [had been] wrongly decided."6 
"There is no doubt in my mind," he boldly declared, "that [Jones'] 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1974, Swarthmore College; 
J.D. 1977, Yale. - Ed. This article has benefitted from the helpful comments of William Es· 
kridge, Philip Frickey, Richard Lempert, Terrance Sandalow, and Frederick Schauer. 
1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
2. 42 u.s.c. § 1982 (1982). 
3. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
4. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1982). 
5. 108 s. Ct. 1419, 1420 (1988). 
6. 427 U.S. at 190. 
20 
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construction of the statute would have amazed the legislators who 
voted for it."7 Yet Stevens joined the Court's opinion. He noted that 
Jones had become a well-established precedent, consistently reaffirmed 
by the Court in the intervening years; and none of the reasons for 
overturning precedent appeared compelling. It was particularly im-
portant to Stevens that, whether or not Jones "accurately reflect[ed] 
the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with 
·the prevailing sense of justice today."8 
Putting to one side Justice Stevens' respect for stare decisis,9 his 
opinion suggests two different ways of thinking about statutory inter-
pretation. The first is "archeological":10 the meaning of a statute is 
set in stone on the date of its enactment, and it is the interpreter's task 
to uncover and reconstruct that original meaning. This view seems to 
be the basis for Stevens' ·conviction that Jones was wrongly decided -
that is, the majority in Jones incorrectly identified the enacting legisla-
ture's intent. 
The second way to think about statutory interpretation is "nauti-
cal." At the risk of overextending a metaphor, it may be described as 
follows. Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the 
ship's ports-of-call, safe harbors and ultimate destination may be a 
product of the ship's captain, the weather, and other factors not identi-
fied at the time the ship sets sail. This model understands a statute as 
an on-going process (a voyage) in which both the shipbuilder and sub-
sequent navigators play a role. The dimensions and structure of the 
craft determine where it is capable of going, but the current course is 
set primarily by the crew on board. (Of course, Congress may send 
subsequent messages to the ship or change the waters in which the 
ship is sailing.) The nautical metaphor is suggested by Justice Stevens' 
willingness to test Jones by the "mores of today." 11 
Traditional debates about statutory interpretation have usually 
been intramural disputes within the archeological metaphor. 12 Tues~ 
7. 427 U.S. at 189. 
8. 427 U.S. at 191. 
9. Steve~ has consistently indicated a strong inclination not to overrule statutory prece-
dents. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1459 
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
10. My use of this terminology derives, I think, from a sentence in Charles Curtis' fine arti-
cle, A Better Theory of Interpretation. 3 V AND. L. REv. 407, 415 (1950): "Better be prophetic 
than archeological, better deal with the future than with the past .... " 
11. 427 U.S. at 192. This is not to suggest that Stevens adopts a "nautical" metaphor. In-
deed, it seems clear that if he were deciding Jones as an initial matter, he would hold that the 
statute does not cover private discrimination. It is stare decisis, not a desire to update statutes, 
that motivates Stevens' statements about current mores. 
12. But there have been early supporters of a more present-minded approach to statutory 
22 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:20 
have revolved around the terms "plain meaning," "intent," and "pur-
pose." But recent scholarship is taking to the sea. Part I of this article 
examines archeological statutory interpretation, describing its two 
main forms - textualism and intentionalism. In Part II, I suggest 
that significant nonoriginalist elements are present in archeological in-
terpretive theory and practice. In Part III, I offer a defense and an 
example of nautical interpretation. The concluding comments address 
the implications of the analysis for Patterson. 
I. EXCAVATING STATUTORY MEANING: ARCHEOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES 
The archeological metaphor conceives of statutory meaning as de-
termined on the date of the statute's enactment. The model is prem-
ised on legislative supremacy and separation of powers. In our system 
of government, the legislature is assigned the chief law-making respon-
sibility; an interpreter's job is to be faithful to the legislative will - as 
expressed in authoritative utterances called statutes - lest the inter-
preter become the lawmaker. The archeological model purports to 
guard against judicial lawmaking by conceiving of the interpreter's 
task as essentially a factual inquiry: a judge uncovers and describes an 
already fixed past. 13 To be sure, sophisticated archeology is creative 
and challenging. It must reconstruct a culture from half-buried foun-
dations and some scattered pots. But the archeologist, at least in the-
ory, recreates the past culture as it was without introducing 
anachronistic artifacts. 
Two strategies of interpretation have dominated the archeological 
perspective: textualism (or plain meaning) and intentionalism (or pur-
pose analysis). 14 Textualism puts primary emphasis on the language 
of the statute itself. Its battle slogan is Holmes' epigram: "We do not 
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute 
means."15 
Textualism is linked to legislative supremacy and democratic the-
ory in two ways. First, the concept of legislative supremacy must in-
interpretation. E.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); Curtis, supra 
note 10. 
13. Cf. J.B. White, Constructing a Constitution: "Original Intention" in the Slave Cases, 41 
Mo. L. REV. 239 (1988) (constitutional interpretation based on the intent of the Framers tends 
to reduce questions of law to those of fact). 
14. These terms derive from Professor Brest's taxonomy for constitutional interpretation. 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). Pro· 
fessor Eskridge has also made use of Brest's terminology. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpre-
tation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987). 
15. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). 
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elude a "rule of recognition" that tells us which acts of the legislature 
are authoritative. Textualism is grounded on a positivist claim that 
only the language actually adopted by the legislature is law. 
Unenacted intentions, no matter how resolutely stated in legislative 
materials, cannot be authoritative because they have not been adopted 
according to constitutionally prescribed procedures.16 Textualism also 
makes the claim that "legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary 
meaning of the words used." 17 Thus, accepting the "plain meaning" 
of a statute is said to serve legislative supremacy because it purport-
edly requires understanding statutory language in the way the legisla-
ture wanted it to be understood. While it is apparent that plain 
meaning will not always identify the legislature's actual meaning, tex-
tualism is willing to accept plain meaning as a reasonable approxima-
tion of legislative intent in order to serve the other goal of the 
archeological model - judicial restraint. By restricting courts to the 
language of the statute, textualism attempts to prevent the creative 
judicial lawmaking that can occur when judges consult legislative 
materials and the social context of the statute.18 
It should be stressed that textualism need not be archeological. An 
interpreter could construe statutory language based on the current 
meaning of the legislature's words. But if limiting judicial activism is 
a primary concern of a textualist, she is likely to favor an archeological 
textualism that restricts interpreters to a fixed past. 
Intentionalism, the second major archeological strategy, claims 
that textualism inappropriately ignores contextual elements in statu-
tory interpretation. Contextual analysis is necessary as a matter of 
semantics (words have no "plain meaning"; meaning depends on con-
text and usage). Moreover, examination of circumstances preceding 
enactment may give interpreters a clearer understanding of how the 
legislature would have wanted the particular statutory question re-
solved. Getting closer to what the legislature actually intended is 
thought to serve the goal of legislative supremacy better. Unlike tex-
tualism, which sees the words of the statute as "law," intentionalism 
locates statutory law beyond, or behind, the statutory language. The 
16. See Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J. 371, 375 
(under democratic theory, the statute rather than extra-statutory materials governs the nation); 
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 9-10 (1975). 
17. United States v. James, 106 S. Ct. 3116, 3121 (1986) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. 
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)). The "intentionalist" defense of plain meaning is sometimes 
stated in the form of a presumption: the legislature is presumed to have intend¢ that its statute 
be read according to its plain meaning. See Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in 
the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 6 (1939). 
18. A plain meaning approach may serve other goals as well, such as obviating the need for 
expensive and time-consuming investigations of legislative history. 
24 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:20 
actual words used by the legislature may be strong evidence of its in-
tent, but they are merely windows on the legislative intent (or pur-
pose) that is the law. It is this perspective that allows us to make sense 
of the claim that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and 
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the 
intention of its makers."19 
Some intentionalists are heady archeologists. They would scruti-
nize the legislative materials to see if the legislature actually consid-
ered and expressed an opinion on the question under review. Where 
no specific intent can be located, they would, in effect, have the inter-
preter reconvene the enacting legislature to determine how it would 
have wanted the statutory question resolved.20 
The approach of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks outlined in The 
Legal Process represents a weaker intentionalist model.21 Recognizing 
the difficulty of recovering (or creating) the answer that the enacting 
legislature would have given to a specific question of interpretation, 
Hart and Sacks suggest that an interpreter identify the broader pur-
poses embodied in the legislation and answer the interpretive question 
in a manner consistent with those purposes. The approach is archeo-
logical because it attributes purposes to the legislation as of its date of 
enactment, and it is intentionalist because it looks beyond the words of 
the statute to the underlying purposes that the legislature was attempt-
ing to pursue. 
Despite theoretical differences as deep as the conception of what 
constitutes "law," textualism and intentionalism somehow manage to 
coexist in modem statutory interpretation.22 The typical judicial opin-
ion begins by analyzing the statutory language and then purports to 
show that the statute's legislative history supports the "plain mean-
ing" of the text.23 One reason why the American legal system has not 
settled upon a single theory of statutory interpretation is that neither 
19. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
20. E.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
Cm. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) [hereinafter Statutory Interpretation]; Horack, In the Name of 
Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119 (1931-32). 
21. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). 
22. The confused state of interpretive theory and practice is often "demonstrated" by refer-
ring to Karl Llewellyn's famous compilation of matched pairs of canons of construction. Llewel-
lyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes 
Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950). Actually, Llewellyn's list betrays more 
structure than is usually thought. Many of the canons on the "thrust" side of the chart are 
consistent with a textualist approach; many of those on the "parry" side are intentionalist. 
23. E.g., Webster v. Roe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 
(1987). 
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textualism nor intentionalism can fully serve the goals of archeology 
- legislative supremacy and judicial restraint. 
Plain meaning does not allow an interpreter to prefer the spirit to 
the letter of the law, even if review of the legislative materials would 
convince the reasonable reader that the enacting legislature could not 
have intended that "plain meaning" control. "Why should the judge 
be permitted to impose his own reference or that of some hypothetical 
average person on statutory words," John Kernochan has asked, "in-
stead of inquiring in the first instance as to the reference of the enac-
tors? Does it not seem obvious that a way to minimize the risk of 
frustrating the legislative will is to pose the question which is keyed to 
legislative will, the question as to what was meant or purposed by the 
legislators?"24 Furthermore, while a textualist court may think it is 
improving the legislative process ("next time they'll say it clearly"), it 
may actually be imposing huge costs on a legislature too busy to re-
draft "unclear" statutes or not prescient enough to provide for future 
possibilities. 25 
Intentionalists know that recovery of specific intent is quite un-
likely, and that most litigated statutory questions involve issues never 
considered by the legislature.26 They must satisfy themselves, there-
fore, with "manifest"27 or "imputed"28 intent; that is, something they 
are willing to call intent derived from the materials deemed appropri-
ate to consult in the search for intent. As Reed Dickerson notes, 
"[i]ntended meaning . . . remains the ultimate object of search even 
though no method has yet been devised by which this meaning can be 
directly known."29 
Judge Richard Posner has adopted several intentionalist meta-
phors in recent articles. 30 He labels his strongest intentionalist model 
24. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 343 
(1976). See Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1984 Duke L.J. 380, 386 ("If judges 
are to make congressional primacy meaningful, they cannot afford to ignore the obvious tools 
which members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and to describe the meaning of 
the words used in the statute."). 
25. See Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. 
L.J. 414, 420 (1961) ("[O]ne price ... [ofa textualist approach would be] an inordinate amount 
of delay in correcting what might not have actually been intended - granted the present compli-
cated machinery of the legislative process."). 
26. Even where a particular issue has been considered by the legislature, the notion of "in-
tent" of a multi-member body is quite problematic. The mandatory cite here is Radin, supra note 
12. For recent discussions, see Brest, supra note 14; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 317-27 
(1986). This truism seems to have lost its power through constant repetition. 
27. R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 85 ("best working approximation" of actual intent is 
intent "most plausible to infer from the appropriate objective manifestation of intent"). 
28. Cohen, supra note 26, at 418. 
29. R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 36: 
30. See, e.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 20, at 817 ("imaginative reconstruc-
26 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:20 
"imaginative reconstruction:" the interpreter "should try to put him-
self in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they 
would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him."31 The 
interpretive task, so described, is so daunting that it is difficult to take 
Posner's suggestion at face value. The reconstruction project demands 
not only that we completely understand each of the enacting legisla-
tors in their own time, but also that we help them fully understand the 
import of the interpretive question facing us today. For example, we 
cannot sensibly determine whether a legislature that drafted a statute 
regulating "vehicles" in 1875 would want it applied to automobiles, 
unless we can imagine the legislators knowing enough about cars to 
make a rational judgment. Once we have "educated" the enacting leg-
islature, we must call it back into session and reconstruct how it would 
have debated and answered today's question as it would have under-
stood it back then knowing what we know now. It is thus not surpris-
ing that scholar Posner has subsequently developed a different 
intentionalist metaphor.32 Furthermore, a review of Judge Posner's 
recent opinions reveals no full-scale attempt at "imaginative 
reconstruction." 
The leading intentionalist theory - Hart and Sacks' purpose anal-
ysis - expressly rejects defining the interpretive task as "ascer-
tain[ing] the intention of the legislature with respect to the matter at 
issue."33 By asking interpreters to assume, "unless the contrary un-
mistakably appears," that "the legislature was made up of reasonable 
persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,"34 their approach 
hardly guarantees identification of the actual purposes behind a stat-
tion;" interpreter should think himself into the minds of the enacting legislators); R. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS (1985) 286-93 ("imaginative reconstruction;" interpreter should put 
himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators); Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RBS. L. REV. 179 (1987) [hereinafter 
Legal Formalism] (analogizing statutes to garbled military orders; the task of the interpreter is to 
figure out what outcome will best advance the program or enterprise set on foot by the enact-
ment); Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 848-52 & 851 n.41 
(1988) [hereinafter Skepticism] (describing both the imaginative reconstruction and command 
models as modes of interpretation distinct from logical or scientific reasoning). 
31. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 30, at 286-87. In an earlier article, Pos-
ner defined the task of imaginative reconstruction as "think[ing oneself] ... into the minds of the 
enacting legislators." Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 20, at 817. He has apparently 
opted for shoes over minds in describing his metaphor. Posner, Skepticism, supra note 30, at 849 
n.37 & 851 ("The proper conception is knowledge by empathy, not knowledge by mind read-
ing."). I leave to the reader whether putting oneself in the shoes of legislators is a task substan-
tially easier than thinking oneself into their minds. 
32. Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 30. The move here is from asking how the enacting 
legislature would have answered the question to asking how the enacting legislature would have 
wanted a subsequent interpreter to answer the question. 
33. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 21, at 1410. 
34. Id. at 1415. 
October 1988] · Updating Statutory Interpretation 27 
· ute. As will be explored below, the power of the Hart and Sacks meth-
odology is its ability to generate statutory purposes that support and 
fit into a coherent set of legal principles. But it should be clear that 
those purposes may be quite inconsistent with the original legislative 
plan. 
In sum, in an attempt to restrain interpreters, textualism accepts a 
substantial margin of error in identifying legislative will. Plausible 
versions of intentionalism may get closer to actual intent; however, as 
Dickerson points out, "there are frequent deviations of manifest intent 
from actual intent, [and] there is no known way to measure these devi-
ations. " 35 Furthermore, under an intentionalist approach, an increase 
in accuracy is purchased at the price of greater opportunities for judi-
cial policymaking. The problem is that the underlying objective of the 
archeological model - legislative supremacy - is served by accuracy 
and judicial restraint. Yet we cannot seem to achieve both at the same 
time. 
The inherent limitations of textualism and intentionalism have 
produced cycles in the history of interpretive theory. According to 
Harry Jones, the "plain meaning rule" gained dominance in the late 
nineteenth century when .courts grew concerned about the flexibility 
occasioned by techniques of "equitable" interpretation that looked to 
intent or spirit of a statute.36 In the first half of the· twentieth cen-
tury,37 the plain meaning approach was undermined by the realist cri-
tique of "mechanical jurisprudence" and the rise of an instrumental 
theory of law. Scholars ridiculed the idea that words had implicit 
meaning that could simply be read off the page; "modern" theory un-
derstood that meaning was a function of usage, context and purpose. 
Hart and Sacks, of course, produced the most sustained intention-
alist argument, 38 and for years they have dominated the interpretive 
scene. "In a deep sense," Dean Calabresi writes, "we are all followers 
of Henry Hart and know the moves almost by instinct."39 But textual-
35. R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 85. 
36. Jones, supra note 17, at 5. See generally Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A 
Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985). 
37. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 17; Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 
MINN. L. REV. 509 (1940); Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 
335 (1949). 
38. Hart and Sacks' theory of statutory interpretation built on and reflected the efforts of 
many others, including Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. 
L. REV. 370 (1947); Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957 
(1940); Horack, supra note 20. 
39. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 87 (1982). See R. DICK-
ERSON, supra note 16, at 87 ("For most, [legislative purpose] is the touchstone of statutory 
interpretation."). 
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ism never quite gave up the ghost.40 Now, after three decades of near 
hegemony, the Hart and Sacks approach is coming under increasing 
fire. 
The current attack on intentionalism, and Hart and Sacks in par-
ticular, comes from several different directions. Public choice theory 
provides a new basis for the old claim of the realists that "legislative 
intent" is and can only be a fiction; and it is no more sympathetic to 
the legal process assumption that legislators reasonably pursue reason-
able objectives.41 If, as public choice theory asserts, legislation is the 
product of compromises among groups, then attributing a purpose to a 
statute either may improperly privilege the interests of one group over 
another (thereby undermining the bargain) or may impute a purpose 
where none (other than the desire to reach agreement) existed.42 
These lines of argument will be called "the public choice claim." 
A second line of attack - the "judicial activism claim" - asserts 
that resort to legislative history in search of specific intent or purpose 
has become a way for activist judges to avoid clear language and to 
rewrite statutes to further their own ideas of the public good.43 For 
example, in his dissent in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority had ignored plain statutory 
language prohibiting race-conscious employment decisions and relied 
on what it identified as the underlying statutory purpose (integration 
of blacks into the mainstream of American society) to uphold volun-
tary, private affirmative action programs.44 The judicial activism 
40. See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpre-
tation in the ''Modem" Federal Courts, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975). 
41. See, e.g .• R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 30, at 288. 
42. Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of specific provisions 
ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics 
of legislative action. Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague 
social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply on the means for 
effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard fought com-
promises. Invocation of the "plain purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms of the 
statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in the end, prevents the 
effectuation of congressional intent. 
Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986) (Burger, C.J.). 
43. See Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
Soc. PoL. 59, 62 (1988) [hereinafter, Original Intent] (the search for intent "greatly increases the 
discretion, and therefore the power, of the court"). But cf. Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of 
Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & Soc. POL. 43, 47 (1988) (claiming that in constitu-
tional adjudication the legislative history "often provide[s] the only restraint upon an expansive 
and inaccurate interpretation of what [the constitutional] clauses were originally drafted to 
accomplish"). 
44. 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a similar claim in another Title 
VII case, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1473 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (majority opinion "is a demonstration ..• of the instability and 
unpredictable expansion which the substitution of judicial improvisation for statutory text has 
produced"). Another recent example is Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 
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claim turns The Legal Process methodology on its head. Hart and 
Sacks advocated contextual analysis as the way to resolve the ambigui-
ties inherent in language. Modem critics, however, see contextual 
analysis as introducing great flexibility in interpretation by expanding 
the range of factors that may be consulted (or manipulated).45 
The third route of attack - the "legislative process claim" - is 
that intentionalism breeds bad legislative habits. Legislators can draft 
sloppy statutes or leave hard issues unresolved, safe in the knowledge 
that an intentionalist court will bail them out by fashioning a statutory 
purpose to resolve novel cases. Furthermore, legislative reports once 
written to inform legislators about pending legislation, and legislative 
floor debates once intended to provide a forum for deliberation, are 
now primarily constructed to influence future interpreters.46 As Jus-
tice Scalia has noted, "the more the courts have relied upon committee 
reports in recent years, the less reliable they have become."47 
These criticisms of The Legal Process methodology suggest two al-
ternative interpretive strategies. One can either try to improve inten-
tionalism (as Judge Posner purports to do by rejecting the Hart and 
Sacks assumptions of the reasonableness of the legislative process), or 
one can tum one's back on intentionalism. Some judges and scholars, 
choosing this second route, have begun to advocate a method of inter-
pretation that I will label "the new plain meaning. "48 
Sometimes the new plain meaning is expressly archeological. 
Judge Easterbrook, for one, advocates what he calls "original mean-
ing": "meaning comes from the ring the words would have had to a 
skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the same problem."49 
2641, 2664 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accusing majority of 
distorting purpose of section of N.L.R.A. and ignoring plain meaning of statute). 
45. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 16, at 376-79. 
46. See W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 698-752 (1988). 
47. Address by Judge Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History 7 (delivered be-
tween fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools in varying forms) (copy on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
48. The two leading "plain meaning" advocates are Judges Easterbrook and Scalia. E.g., 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1223 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Easter-
brook, Original Intent, supra note 43; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 
(1983). Other judges have concurred in Scalia's criticisms of the use of legislative history. See 
Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 443 (1988) (citing 
opinions of circuit judges Buckley, Starr and Kozinski); Starr, supra note 16. 
The trend toward literalism was powerfully demonstrated in my colleague Richard Pildes' 
student note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the 
Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892 (1982). Pildes provides a slightly different perspective on 
why the Court has returned to textualism, linking such an approach to a substantive theory of 
laissez-faire individualism. 
49. Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 43, at 61. Elsewhere on the same page, Judge 
Easterbrook describes his methodology in slightly broader terms: "Original meaning is derived 
30 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:20 
But other versions do not explicitly yoke "plain meaning" to 
originalism. Justice Scalia's methodology, for example, is primarily 
anti-intentionalist, professing a strong aversion to relying on legislative 
history for interpretive guidance. so "Judges interpret laws rather than 
reconstruct legislators' intentions,'' he has written recently. "Where 
the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an 
unenacted legislative intent."51 Scalia recognizes that much statutory 
language cannot fairly be characterized as clear. In such cases (and 
where there is no prior agency interpretation to which to defer), he 
will search for other sources of meaning (for example, the use of simi-
lar language in other statutes52) or adopt an interpretation that harmo-
nizes the statute with related legislation. 53 These techniques are not 
necessarily archeological; indeed, it will be suggested below that 
Scalia's approach ends up including some nautical tools. But his ap-
proach generally manages to avoid an investigation of the legislative 
history.54 
The case for the new plain meaning, not surprisingly, finds support 
in the attacks on intentionalism. If legislative intent doesn't exist (be-
cause statutes are merely unprincipled bargains), don't look for it; con-
from words and structure, and perhaps from identifying the sort of problem the legislature was 
trying to address." Under either description, reliance on the intent of the legislators is rejected: 
"What any member of Congress thought his words would do is irrelevant. We do not care about 
his mental processes." Id. 
50. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2423-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part); l.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, ·J., concurring in the 
judgment); Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 777 F.2d 1, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
51. l.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
52. E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2549-51 (1988); Kungys v. United States, 108 
S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (1988). 
53. E.g., United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988); 
United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668 (1988). 
54. The lengths to which Justice Scalia will go to avoid relying on legislative history is 
demonstrated by his majority opinion in Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988). That case 
considered the exception in the Equal Access to Justice Act that denies attorney's fees to prevail-
ing parties when the position taken by the United States in litigation was "substantially justified." 
The relevant Senate, House and Conference Committee Reports, relied on by the court of appeals 
below, stated that the "substantially justified" test was "one of reasonableness in law and fact." 
Justice Scalia ends up with the same result, but he studiously avoids citing the legislative history. 
Instead, he refers to the meaning attributed to the terms "substantial evidence" in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and "substantially justified" in Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Justice Scalia must be admired for the tenacity with which he puts his principles into 
practice, but his technique here seems quite at odds with other principles he holds equally dear. 
Well-schooled in public choice theory, Scalia knows that it is perilous to believe that similar 
terms used in different statutes refer to similar concepts. There is little evidence that Congress 
seeks or achieves such coherence. Thus Justice Scalia seems to be exchanging one fiction (legisla-
tive intent) for another (consistency of meaning across statutes). There may be good reasons for 
indulging in such a fiction; indeed I will rely on similar fictions below. But one can hardly do so 
on the basis of the public choice theory that Scalia uses against intentionalism. 
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centrate on the only thing the legislature actually enacted - the words 
of the statute. If activist judges manipulate legislative history to 
achieve their own goals, stop relying on it. And if intentionalism pro-
vides an incentive for legislative drafters to be imprecise or to buck 
issues to future interpreters, then remove the incentive by stating that 
only the express words of the statute will be enforced. 
All interpretive theories must ultimately be grounded in a political 
theory and a theory of law, even if the interpreter is unwilling to rec-
ognize or state the underlying premises. What is potentially perni-
cious about the new plain meaning is the tendency of its proponents to 
attempt to justify it on descriptive grounds (i.e., the legislative process 
produces unprincipled compromises) as if the normative case follows 
as a matter of course. ss But to demonstrate the power of the public 
choice claim -· that is, that the Hart and Sacksian assumption about 
the reasonableness of legislative behavior may be flawed - is not ·to 
establish the legitimacy of a plain meaning approach (or any other 
interpretive theory).56 Jonathan Macey has demonstrated that a 
strong case can be made for a Hart and Sacks approach even if (or 
particularly because) the public choice view of the world is correct.s7 
Macey notes that private interest legislation is invariably justified by a 
public-regarding purpose. An interpretive strategy that searches for 
and affirms public-regarding purposes will undermine the private deals 
that may be the basis for the statute. According to Macey, "where 
[there is] a sharp divergence between the stated public-regarding pur-
pose . . . and the true special interest motivation behind a particular 
statute, courts will, under the traditional [Hart and Sacks] approach, 
resolve any ambiguities in the statute consistently with the stated pub-
lic-regarding purpose. "58 
Once the descriptive defense of the new plain meaning is pushed 
aside, what remains are claims about courts and legislatures that have 
become fashionable among critics from the right - claims that are 
deeply antagonistic to the political process that plain meaning pur-
ports to be defending against anti-democratic liberal judges. To the 
extent that a review of the legislative history persuades one that the 
legislature could not have intended what the "plain meaning" seems to 
55. Thus, Judge Posner uses the public choice claim to justify his approach of "imaginative 
reconstruction." R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 30, at 288-89. 
56. See Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statu-
tory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988) (public choice theory does not support any general 
theory of statutory interpretation). 
57. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An 
Interest-Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). 
58. Id. at 251. 
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indicate, 59 a judge is doing the legislature no favor in enforcing the 
"plain meaning."60 Thus, the judicial activism claim must be an asser-
tion that the risk of manipulative judging under an intentionalist ap-
proach outweighs the benefit of allowing judges to consult legislative 
history as an aid in determining what the legislature meant. But if the 
instances of bad-faith judging are so great that the plain meaning theo-
rists are comfortable in their calculation, one wonders why the legisla-
ture (which, after all, is the injured party) hasn't taken steps to reduce 
bad-faith judging by writing statutes more clearly. 61 Furthermore, if 
we assume such a plethora of willful judges, why should we believe 
that they will not similarly misuse a plain meaning approach? As 
Judge Posner has noted in anticipation of charges that his strategy of 
"imaginative reconstruction" can be manipulated .by judges, "the irre-
sponsible judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he 
desires."62 
The response of the new plain meaning advocate might be that we 
can't expect the legislature to put an end to intentionalist interpreta-
tion because the legislature benefits from intentionalism. Thus, the 
new plain meaning is preferable to intentionalism, the argument might 
run, because it provides an incentive for the legislature to reform itself. 
But this strategy seems at war with the judicial activism claim because 
it puts the courts in the intrusive role of telling the legislature how it 
can better do its job. Indeed, the new plain meaning ends up being 
more intrusive than the old legal process. Hart and Sacks developed 
an interpretive theory that dealt with the problems of the legislative 
process by telling courts to take the high road: assume that legislators 
are reasonable and construct purposes that pursue reasonable goals 
and help rationalize the law. The new plain meaning demands that 
the legislature break bad intentionalist habits or suffer the 
consequences. 
In short, the new plain meaning turns out not to be a theory dedi-
cated to or grounded on legislative supremacy. It is instead a political 
strategy for disciplining both judges and legislators. 
59. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
60. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 48, at 458-60 (a "four comers" rule of interpretation 
will raise the cost of drafting legislation, require Congress to enact corrective legislation more 
frequently, tend to discourage additional legislation, and create difficult problems of interpreta-
tion readily solvable if legislative history is consulted). 
61. Justice Scalia apparently believes that no statute is safe from ill-willed judges. He begins 
his dissent in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1465 
(1987), with the following acid lines: "With a clarity, had it not proven so unavailing, one might 
well recommend as a model of statutory draftsmanship, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
declares .... " 
62. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 30, at 287. 
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II. NAUTICALNESS IN A.RCHEOLOGICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Archeological statutory interpretation purports to pay attention 
only to events occurring before or contemporaneously with the enact-
ment of the statute. Yet the allure of the nautical model proves hard 
to resist. This section will show how nautical elements are a part of 
archeological theory and practice. 
A. Theory 
1. Intentionalism 
Judge Posner's imaginative reconstruction is explicated in strong 
archeological terms: "The judge's job is not to keep a statute up to 
date in the sense of making it reflect contemporary values, but to im-
agine as best he can how the legislators who enacted the statute would 
have wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee." What 
should a judge do when imaginative reconstruction is impossible, 
"either because the necessary information is lacking or because the 
legislators had failed to agree on essential premises"? At first, Posner 
suggests an archeological solution: the judge must attribute a meaning 
to the statute that yields "the most reasonable result in the case at 
hand - always bearing in mind that what seems reasonable to the 
judge may not have seemed reasonable to the legislators, and that it is 
their conception of reasonableness, to the extent known, rather than 
the judge's, that should guide decision. "63 
Yet in a later elaboration, Posner seems to adopt a less archeologi-
cal stance. He rejects Hart and Sacks' archeology because of their 
unrealistic assumptions about the way the legislature operates.64 Nor 
will he accept Easterbrook's suggestion that the judge simply "put the 
statute down."65 Posner contends that the judge "cannot just dismiss 
the case out of hand."66 He or she "must decide the case, even though 
on the basis of considerations that cannot be laid at Congress's door. " 67 
Such considerations might include "judicial administrability" or might 
be drawn from "some broadly based conception of the public inter-
est. "68 Since most interesting questions of statutory interpretation are 
difficult precisely because the legislative materials do not yield a deter-
63. Id. at 287. 
64. Id. at 288-89. 
65. Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 43, at 65. 
66. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 30, at 289. See also Posner, Legal For-
malism, supra note 30, at 197-99. 
67. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 30, at 289 (emphasis in original). 
68. Id., at 289. In the earlier article upon which the chapter is based, Posner stated this a bit 
more strongly: "It is inevitable, and therefore legitimate, for the judge in such a case to be moved 
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minative answer, Posner's theory provides ample opportunity for 
nonarcheological factors to play a role in deciding what a statute 
means.69 
The Hart and Sacks approach is generally described in archeologi-
cal terms, and there is much in their complex work upon which one 
could base such a view.7° Certainly, the fact that "legislative purpose" 
drives the model suggests an archeological approach; one would nor-
mally assume that purpose is fixed at time of enactment. A revisionist 
reading of The Legal Process, however, is in order. 
One cannot appreciate the Hart and Sacks project without putting 
their theory of interpretation into the context of the book as a whole. 
Unlike many of us who write about statutory interpretation, Hart and 
Sacks begin by laying out a theory oflaw from which they believe their 
interpretive method follows. Their conception of law and legal institu-
tions is a deeply instrumental one. 71 
Law is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving 
to solve the basic problems of social living. . . . Legal arrangements 
Qaws) are provisions for the future in aid of this effort. Sane people do 
not make provisions for the future which are purposeless. It can be ac-
cepted as a fixed premise, therefore, that every statute and every doctrine 
of unwritten law developed by the decisional process has some kind of 
purpose or objective, however difficult it may be on occasion to ascertain 
it or to agree exactly how it should be phrased. 72 
by considerations that cannot be referred back to legislative purpose." Posner, Statutory Inter-
pretation, supra note 20, at 820. 
Posner also recognizes that some statutes "beg[] ... the courts to do what they can to make 
[them] reasonable." An example is the Sherman Act: "It was enacted in 1890, but is interpreted 
today as if Congress had enacted the evolving economic analysis of monopoly and competition. 
Today the Act means, not what its framers may have thought, but what economists and econom-
ics-minded lawyers and judges think." Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 30, at 212, 209. 
69. And Judge Posner has shown, on occasion, a willingness to indulge in statutory updating. 
E.g., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987). Interestingly, the Supreme Court 
rejected Posner's nautical approach in Holzer in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 
(1988). See also Standard Office Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 819 F.2d 1371 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(where neither case law nor administrative interpretation provided a sensible reading of the stat-
ute, court relied upon policy considerations of minimizing tax-avoidance behavior and protecting 
reasonable expectations). 
70. But see G. CALABRESI, supra note 39, at 87 (recognizing updating element in Hart and 
Sacks). 
71. The social problem has been broadly described as that of "establishing, maintaining 
and perfecting the conditions necessary for community life to perform its role in the com-
plete development of man." If this were right, it would follow that the ultimate test of the 
goodness or badness of every institutional procedure and of every arrangement which grows 
out of such a procedure is whether or not it helps to further this purpose. It is an important 
question whether this is right. These materials take the position that it is. 
H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 21, at 110-11 (quoting Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in 
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW (essays prepared for discussion at a conference on the occasion of 
the two hundredth anniversary of the birth of John Marshall, Harvard Law School, Sept. 22-24, 
1955), at 47, 52). 
72. Id. at 166. 
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The task of the adjudicator is to discover the principle or purpose 
implicit in the law and apply it to the case at hand. In so doing, the 
interpreter is carrying forward the project, begun by the enacting legis-
lature, in a sensible and restrained fashion. Hart and Sacks call this 
process "reasoned elaboration." Recognition of the role of purpose is 
not just a technique for statutory interpretation; it is the sine qua non 
of law: "Every statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purpo-
sive act. The idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign 
to the idea of law and inadmissible."73 Thus, the Hart and Sacks 
method is more than a way to resolve cases; it is the only way for the 
result of interpretation to be called "law." 
The crucial question is what is being "elaborated." The Legal Pro-
cess makes clear that the adjudicator is not simply charged with ana-
lyzing the case in light of the particular purpose behind a particular 
statute. The design of the book is far grander. The job of the adjudi-
cator is to fit the statute and its application into an ongoing, coherent 
legal system. Thus, the purpose of any particular legal arrangement 
"is always a subordinate one in aid of the more general and thus more 
nearly ultimate purposes of the law. Doubts about the purposes of 
particular statutes or decisional doctrines, it woµld seem to follow, 
must be resolved, if possible, so as to harmonize them with more gen-
eral principles and policies. The organizing and rationalizing power of 
this idea is inestimable. " 14 . 
Throughout the chapter on statutory interpretation, Hart and 
Sacks attempt to show how the process of adjudication imposes on the 
decisionmaker a duty to understand the statute in its broader legal and 
social context. Their summary of the approach states that purposes 
"may exist in hierarchies or constellations," and it si11gles out one such 
"constellation" which is "invariable in the law and of immense impor-
tance:" "The purpose of a statute must always be treated as including 
not only an immediate purpose or group of relatec:J. purposes but a 
larger and more subtle purpose as to how the particular statute is to be 
fitted into the legal system as a whole."75 
The harmonization of American law into a rational whole is no 
small order. The public choice literature ought to make us skeptical of 
the ability of a judge to discover the animating purpose (or purposes) 
of a statute, and that difficulty may be raised exponentially if one is 
attempting to discover a harmonious set of purposes that inform our 
73. Id. at 1156. 
74. Id. at 167.(emphasis in original). 
75. Id. at 1414. 
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entire legal system. The work of critical legal studies scholars suggests 
that irreconcilable tensions lie at the base of most of our legal doctrine 
and legal institutions. But while post-legal process scholarship may 
make us doubtful about the chances of success for the Hart and Sacks 
enterprise, it also, paradoxically, provides greater support for the 
method. If legislatures are as unprincipled as public choice asserts, 
then "reasoned elaboration" seems the antidote. That is, courts can 
make up for the messiness of the legislative process by assuming that 
legislators are constituted by "reasonable people pursuing reasonable 
objectives reasonably" and by weaving the imputed purpose into the 
general fabric of the law. This may be a rather poor proxy for actual 
legislative intent, but so be it. Under this interpretation, The Legal 
Process is not about legislative supremacy; it is about the development 
and maintenance of a rational legal system in which the courts are the 
shepherds of purpose and the guardians of principle. 76 
Hart and Sacks, of course, saw law as a dynamic process. Law 
must change as the needs and demands of society change. What, then, 
does one do with a statute passed long ago for purposes no longer 
relevant to today?77 The legal process methodology does not openly 
advocate keeping statutes "up to date," but it seems strongly support-
ive of such an effort. 1s 
Consider an adjudicator who is asked to interpret an older statute. 
No doubt the legislature has enacted many laws since the statute 
under scrutiny, and the common law and constitutional law may also 
have changed over time. The requirement that judges fit the statute 
into the legal system as a whole will necessarily mean that statement of 
the older statute's purpose will be influenced by events occurring after 
enactment. In other words, the Hart and Sacks project must collapse 
(or fit) the past into the present. This does not argue against strong 
principles of stare decisis; such principles may be an important part of 
the current legal system, and earlier precedents may still reflect or be 
the basis for current substantive values. But ultimately the methodol-
76. Cf. Professor Weisberg's characterization of G. Calabresi, The Calabresian Judicial Art-
ist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 256 (1983) (noting Calabresi's 
"predisposition toward the image of the heroic judge, who can digest an extraordinary variety of 
materials - legal doctrine, popular belief, science, history, and so forth - and transform them 
into a coherent vision that will educate the legislature along with the rest of the laity"). 
77. As will be discussed below, one can always glide over this question by stating an old 
purpose at a different level of abstraction and reach the result one wishes. See Part II.B.3 infra. 
78. This is not to deny that parts of Hart and Sacks look starkly originalistic: "In determin-
ing the more immediate purpose which ought to be attributed to a statute .•. a court should try 
to put itself in imagination in the position of the legislature which enacted the measure." H. 
HART & A. SACKS, supra note 21, at 1414. But the modifier "immediate" is crucial; it leaves 
room for broader principles that support updating. · 
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ogy must be tested against the present to be coherent. 79 
John Kernochan's intentionalism also expressly includes an up-
dating element, at least when traditional intentionalist tools cannot 
yield a unique result. When the evidence regarding intent is inconclu-
sive, Kernochan argues, the judge must "read the statute so as to make 
the best possible sense of it in the developing legal and social context, 
in a manner consistent with the terms of the statute and with purposes 
reasonably attributable to it .... In weighing policy, the court will be 
acting much as it would act in a common law case when there is no 
binding precedent."80 
2. Textuallsm 
If textualism is understood as the search for "original meaning," 
then there is little room, as a matter of theory, for updating. It is, 
however, quite likely that the re-creation of the past will be influenced 
by the values and meanings of the present. 81 More interesting is how 
few judicial opinions openly adopt a purely originalist strategy. 82 
79. Other nonoriginalist elements in Hart and Sacks' methodology include: (1) a recommen- _ 
dation that the "rigid" reenactment rule (i.e., that the legislature intends to maintain earlier 
interpretations if the Jaw is reenacted without changes) be replaced by the presumption that "if a 
legislature desires a body of Jaw to.lose its capacity for continued growth, it should say so ex-
pressly and unmistakably," id. at 1404; (2) recognition that a statute can "eventually take[] on a 
life of its own, governed by the evolving principles by which it has been interpreted rather than 
by any direct reference to original purpose," id. at 1379; and (3) willingness to credit post-enact-
ment aids to construction: "where [an administrative or popular] construction has been widely 
accepted and consistently adhered, i[t] may be said to fix the meaning - to be the meaning 
which experience has demonstrated the words do bear." Id. at 1416. 
80. Kernochan, supra note 25, at 357. Reed Dickerson also argues for serving "current so-
cial needs" when statutory and contextual cues cannot provide an answer to the interpretive 
question. R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 242-50. 
81. See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793-804 (1983). 
82. The most striking recent examples of an original meaning approach, Shaare Tefila Con-
gregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987), and Saint Francis College v. AJ-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 
2022 (1987), allow one to see how odd the enterprise appears. The question in those cases was 
whether discrimination against Jews and Arabs was discrimination on the basis of "race," and 
therefore covered by §§ 1981 and 1982. The Supreme Court, in surprisingly brief unanimous 
opinions by Justice White, stated that "the question before us is not whether Jews [or Arabs] are 
considered to be a separate race by today's standards, but whether, at the time [§ 1981 and] 
§ 1982 [were] adopted, Jews [or Arabs] constituted a group of people that Congress intended to 
protect." 107 S. Ct. at 2022. After examining dictionaries and encyclopedias of the mid-1800s, 
White concluded that "definitions of race when § 1982 was passed were not the same as they are 
today" and the statutes were "intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of 
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic 
characteristics." Id. at 2021-22. Discrimination against Jews and Arabs was therefore actiona-
ble under the statutes. It is obvious that the Court was not about to tackle the extremely com-
plex question of what constitutes a "race" today (in a footnote in Al-Khazraji, it noted that some 
scientists "conclude that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than 
biological, in nature," 107 S. Ct. at 2026 n.4). It therefore resorted to "original meaning" as a 
way to expand the civil rights laws without opening up controversial issues in social science, 
biology, and group politics. But one senses that the decisions of the Court had far more to do 
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If one adopts Justice Scalia's version of textualism, the question 
becomes a matter of the sources from which one derives the "plain 
meaning" of the text. Scalia's anti-intentionalism studiously avoids 
examining legislative history for such meaning. 83 Instead, he has 
tended to rely either on current understandings of the statutory lan-
guage (for recently enacted statutes)84 or on the meaning that has been 
given to similar phrases in other statutes. 85 The first manifestly ap-
plies current meaning; the second may or may not, depending on the 
age of the statutes consulted and the time of their interpretation. But 
the second strategy will certainly be a rather poor measure of original 
meaning and is quite likely to yield a meaning generally accepted 
today. 
B. Practice 
Despite the common impression that statutory interpretation is 
generally archeological, a look at the tools of the trade display some 
surprisingly nautical instruments. 
1. Canons at Sea 
Courts are often called upon to interpret statutes existing in a 
world of related statutes enacted at different times. The canons of 
statutory construction provide a number of suggestions for helping the 
interpreter understand the influence of later-enacted legislation on the 
earlier. Justice Scalia has reminded us that the traditional rules in 
such situations are these: (1) repeals or amendments by implication 
are disfavored; and (2) statutes should be construed so as to give effect 
to each. 86 As Scalia notes, these rules cannot and do not serve original 
intent: "[T]he earlier statute will be given one interpretation at the 
time it is first passed, but a different interpretation later, when there is 
a need to narrow it in order to 'make room' for the operative effect of 
the later enactment. In no way can this be considered a process of 
'giving effect' to the intent of the earlier legislature - nor of the later 
with current views on ethnic discrimination than with a conviction that nineteenth·century no-
tions of race should control the application of civil rights laws today. 
83. See text at notes 50-53 supra. 
84. E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (concurring in the judg-
ment); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1465 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting ) (interpreting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). 
85. E.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988) (examining use of "substantial" in 
federal procedure statutes to give meaning to term "substantially justified" in Equal Access to 
Justice Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A)); Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (1988) 
(looking to interpretations of various criminal statutes to give meaning to term "material" mis-
representation in the denaturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)). 
86. Scalia, supra note 47, at 9. 
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legislature if amendment by implication is excluded."87 
Another common canon - one actually rather regularly followed 
by the Court - is that statutes ought to be interpreted to avoid consti-
tutional questions. 88 Courts invoking this canon examine current con-
stitutional doctrine, not the constitutional rule extant at the time the 
statute was enacted. The canon, therefore, is likely to exert an updat-
ing influence on the interpretation of statutes. 
To see this at work, consider NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chi-
cago. 89 The issue there was whether the National Labor Relations Act 
granted the NLRB jurisdiction over church-operated schools. Recog- . 
nizing the serious constitutional question that would be raised by up-
holding the NLRB's assertion of authority, the Court stated that it 
would have to identify "the affirmative intention of the Congress 
clearly expressed" before concluding that the Act granted jurisdic-
tion. 90 Examining the legislative history of the 1935 Act (as well as 
1947 and 1974 amendments to the Act), the majority could find no 
express intent to cover church-operated schools and therefore ruled 
against the Board. There can be little doubt here that the lurking con-
stitutional issue influenced the Court's interpretation of the statute. 
As the dissent noted, the term "employer" had consistently received 
an expansive reading, given both the manifest public purpose behind 
the Act and the fact that Congress had written into the definition eight 
specific exceptions.91 Thus, it seems clear that but for the constitu- · 
tional issue, the statute would have been interpreted to grant the 
NLRB jurisdiction. Yet the constitutional doctrine that provided the 
interpretive weight in the case was not around at the time Congress 
wrote the definition of "employer."92 
87. Id. See United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 676 (1988) (Scalia, J.). 
88. E.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 
1392, 1397 (1988) (citing cases). 
89. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). This example was suggested by w. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra 
note 46, at 676-89. 
90. 440 U.S. at 501 (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 
372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 
(1957))). 
91. 440 U.S. at 511-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
92. Modem free exercise doctrine is usually traced to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940), which invalidated the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for soliciting funds in the distri-
bution of religious materials without a license. Cantwell was decided five years after Congress 
enacted the NLRA. A leading constitutional treatise reports: 
As of 1960, no case in the Supreme Court had resulted in the overturning of police 
power regulations solely on the basis that they had a coercive effect on the free exercise of 
religion. If the end pursued was a significant secular goal, the Court would uphold inciden-
tal restrictions on religiously motivated activity. 
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1071 (3d ed. 1986). 
Itis·conceivable that a Congress concerned about undue regulation of religion might have not 
intended for the NLRB to regulate church-operated schools. Cf. Holy Trinity Church v. United 
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2. Nonoriginalism in Subsequent Legislative Action 
Courts continue to struggle with the question of the significance 
that should be attributed to a legislature's failure to overrule a prior 
interpretation of a statute. (Professor Eskridge's article in this Sympo-
sium provides a detailed and insightful analysis of the "legislative inac-
tion" doctrine.93) It is interesting that the debate is largely based upon 
nonoriginalistic assumptions. 
Suppose Congress passes a statute at time T. Five years later a 
court (or an agency) construes the statute to mean X and that inter-
pretation is consistently followed in subsequent decisions. Interpreta-
tion X is well known to the legislature; bills have been introduced in 
most sessions which would overturn X but none has been enacted. 
Should an interpreting court, now called upon to reconsider X give 
weight to the legislative inaction? 
An archeologist would begin by wondering why any subsequent 
legislative activity should be relevant to the interpretive question. 
New evidence may cast doubt on whether X was a proper interpreta-
tion of the statute as enacted at time T,· 94 but, the archeologist would 
reason, subsequent legislatures cannot change that original intent or 
meaning (without passing a statute). 
But judges do not dismiss the question out of hand. They regularly 
(if inconsistently) attach significance to "legislative acquiescence." If 
the legislature has "acquiesced" in an interpretation that accurately 
captured original intent, the court's use of the subsequent legislature's 
action will not have an updating effect. However, given political reali-
ties, this course of events seems unlikely. Legislators will benefit or 
lose from a decision to acquiesce in X primarily based on current 
views of the policy embodied by X. While legislators may well couch 
their support for X in originalist terms (thereby hoping to appease op-
ponents of X by shifting the "blame" to the enacting legislature), they 
clearly have a greater interest in whether X makes sense today than in 
accurately reporting the "original intent" of the statute. The nautical 
effect will be even stronger when the legislature acquiesces in an 
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (holding that immigration laws prohibiting immigration of contract 
labor do not cover contract to bring minister to the United States). But this is not the way the 
Court's analysis in Catholic Bishop of Chicago proceeded. 
Changes in constitutional interpretation may also produce expansion of the scope of a statute. 
E.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding Sherman 
Act applicable to insurance industry after Court overrules early decision that insurance was not 
interstate co=erce). See also Lyon, Old Statutes and New Constitutions, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 
599 (1944). 
93. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 81 MICH. L. REV. 67, 71-90 (1988). 
94. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), based upon a reevaluation of the legislative history of§ 1983). 
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agency interpretation since, as will be discussed below, agency con-
structions are quite likely to be based on a present-minded approach to 
statutes. 
It is therefore more likely that "acquiescence" - if it is found95 -
represents a judgment on the current acceptability of the policy of X 
Even where acquiescence is not found, simply to have considered the 
impact of subsequent congressional inaction is to adopt a nonarcheo-
logical stance. 96 
3. Nautical Purposes 
Two indeterminacies pervade purpose analysis. First, it will al-
ways be possible to identify a number of purposes that fit the data 
from which one infers purpose (legislative history, the state of the law 
prior to enactment, the "mischief" sought to be prevented). Some 
purposes may be more plausible than others, but often alternatives wiU 
appear equaUy sensible. For example, in Weber, the majority derived 
from Title VII the purpose of integrating blacks into the economic life 
of the nation; the dissent saw the primary purpose as establishing a 
colorblind standard in private employment decisions. Each view 
found enough support in the record to make its explanation 
plausible.97 
A second indeterminacy arises from the fact that purposes may be 
stated at various levels of generality. To borrow an example from con-
stitutional law, one may create a set of nested purposes for the equal 
protection clause: (1) to grant blacks protection against discrimina-
tion in the exercise of only those rights mentioned in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866; (2) to grant blacks protection against discrimination in 
95. Of course, a legislature's failure to overturn a statutory precedent may say nothing about 
its views of the earlier interpretation. It may indicate inattention, uninterest, or shortness of 
time. 
96. The unwillingness of courts to credit post-enactment legislative history is generally de-
fended on the ground that statements made after passage of the statute cannot be challenged or 
corrected by the enacting legislators and are often likely to represent simply a legislator's attempt 
to accomplish after the fact what he or she could not accomplish during debate of the measure. 
This position appears to be based on archeological concerns. (Even so, the Court has, from time 
to time, been willing to give weight to subsequent legislative statements. See, e.g., Andrus v. 
Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).) However, a thoroughgoing nautical approach might 
also be suspicious of such statements. Since they are often made while legislative attention is 
focussed elsewhere, they may have very little probative value of current understandings of the 
statute or the needs and values of the day; rather, they are likely to represent simply the spin that 
the individual or committee contributing the statement wants to put on the statute. 
97. For other examples, see Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 
(1988); and compare NLRB v. Am. Natl. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (principal purpose of 
federal labor law is to support voluntary collective bargaining and not to write substantive terms 
of a contract), with Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (federal labor 
policy in favor of arbitration leads Court to read arbitration provision into no-strike clause). 
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the exercise of all federal rights; (3) to grant all racial minorities pro-
tection against discrimination; (4) to grant all "oppressed groups" pro-
tection against discrimination.9s 
The flexibility (as one might politely call it) of purpose analysis 
provides room for updating statutes without so acknowledging. As 
time passes, courts may shift the "purpose" of the statute to accommo-
date changed circumstances. Professor Langevoort's rich study of the 
banking laws provides a good example.99 He describes how the Court, 
faced with dramatic changes in the banking industry, attributed a pur-
pose to the Glass-Steagall Act (maintaining bank soundness) quite dif-
ferent from that upon which the legislation was originally predicated 
(forcing banks to channel funds towards traditional commercial and 
agricultural lending rather tlian speculative uses). 
Consider another example, drawn from The Legal Process. too 
Massachusetts had an old statute that required cities and towns to 
keep the highways "reasonably safe and convenient for travellers, with 
their horses, teams and carriages at all seasons." Does the statute 
mandate that communities make sure their roads are safe for the new-
fangled carriages called automobiles? If the purpose attributed to the 
statute is that cities and towns have an obligation to assure safety of 
travel, then the answer should be yes. But if the purpose is that safety 
of travel must be assured without overburdening the fiscal resources of 
the responsible community, then the answer might well be no. Each 
purpose is consistent with the original enactment. Yet the latter pur-
pose (which is what the Massachusetts Supreme Court relied upon in 
1908 in determining that cars are not "carriages" within the meaning 
of the statute) was likely to be formulated only after changes in social 
conditions forced an interpreter to see the statute in a new light. 
4. Agencies at the Helm 
Contrary to popular belief, most statutory interpretation does not 
occur in the courts. Agencies are the captains of the ship of state, and 
they are constantly giving meaning to statutes as they write regula-
tions, bring enforcement actions, adjudicate claims, or issue interpre-
98. See gentf!rally R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 87-88 (noting range of "ever-widening 
purposes" implicit in legislative action). 
99. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the 
Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987). Langevoort's study does 
much more than simply chart this shift. He describes what he calls the "transitional jurispru-
dence" that older statutes go through - from purpose analysis to literalism, application of 
mechanical canons, and deference to agency interpretation as the statute ages and the original 
purpose seems unresponsive to current conditions. 
100. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 21, at 1214-15. 
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tive guidelines. This means that in a significant number of statutory 
cases, the Supreme Court is reviewing a prior agency construction of a 
statute. 
Under the regime of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 101 courts have 
shown substantial deference to agency interpretations. The well-
known Chevron standard states: 
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does 
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be nec-
essary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, ... the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute. 102 
This judicial stance on agency determinations is the most important 
nautical element in the practice of modem statutory interpretation. 
To understand why, one must consider the political world in which 
agencies live. Agencies within the executive branch are headed by per-
sons appointed by, and directly responsible to, the President. So-
called "independent agencies" are generally governed by a number of 
commissioners appointed by the President and approved by the Sen-
ate. All agencies must come to the Congress for appropriations, and 
they are regularly asked to testify on substantive issues within their 
jurisdiction. In such an environment, it seems clear that current pol-
icy considerations, rather than "the original intent of the legislature," 
is likely to guide agency interpretations of statutes. Pleasing a sitting 
President and a sitting Congress is going to keep an agency funded and 
out of trouble. 103 
Archeological judicial attitudes could counteract these present-
minded pressures. Irrespective of the current political winds, an 
agency would be unlikely to adopt an updated interpretation of a stat-
ute if it knew that a court would strike it down on originalist grounds. 
Under Chevron, however, the agencies need rarely fear such disciplin-
ing judicial behavior. Indeed, the case specifically acknowledges the 
role that current policy considerations ought to play in agency actions: 
101. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
102. 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
103. Colin Diver, in an important article, develops a number of reasons why deference to 
agency interpretations may promote "policy coherence." These include uniformity promoted by 
a single agency's decisions (rather than several courts of appeals); continuity of policy over time; 
harmonization of policy with other statutes within an agency's purview; integration of policy 
creation and enforcement; and expeditiousness. Diver recommends deference to administrative 
interpretations when the agency exercises significant policymaking responsibility under the stat-
ute. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 585-92 
(1985). 
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[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibili-
ties may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the in-
cumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Ex-
ecutive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices - resolving the competing in-
terests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or in-
tentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 104 
This is not to say that such updating will necessarily reflect the 
preference of the current Congress. Given the difficulty of enacting 
legislation (as well as the President's veto power), delegation may give 
an agency a fair degree of insulated power. The current controversy 
over the Fairness Doctrine provides a striking example. When an 
FCC dominated by Reagan appointees announced its intent to revoke 
the doctrine, Congress passed legislation to keep it in place. The bill 
was vetoed by President Reagan, and thereafter the FCC formally re-
pealed the doctrine. 105 Clearly, the action of the agency did not con-
form to the wishes of the current Congress; but just as clearly, it was 
based on present-minded political judgments, not the original intent of 
the Congress that granted the FCC authority to impose the Fairness 
Doctrine. 
It is unlikely that a nautical model of statutory interpretation ac-
counts for the Court's decision in Chevron. Concerns about judicial 
competence and activism are more likely to have been the motivating 
factors. 106 The Court no doubt thought that where Congress had not 
provided a clear answer, somebody would have to, and it preferred the 
courts not fill that role. "Judges are not experts in the field," the 
Court noted, "and are not part of either political branch of the Gov-
104. 467 U.S. at 865-66. See Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decis,ions, 1 J. LAW, ECON., & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985) (delegations to agencies pro-
mote responsiveness to desires of the electorate). For an extraordinary recognition of the influ-
ence of presidential politics on agency policy, see Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part): "A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes 
is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Con-
gress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philoso· 
phy of the administration." (Footnote deleted.) 
105. For a detailed review of these events, see Note, "In Stark Contravention of Its Purpose": 
Federal Communications Commission Enforcement and Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, 20 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 799 (1987). 
106. For an interesting alternative understanding of Chevron, see Strauss, One Hundred Fifty 
Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review 
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987) (deferring to agencies fosters national uni-
formity that, given the press of the Court's caseload, cannot easily be achieved by Supreme Court 
review of courts of appeals decisions regarding agency determinations). 
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ernment."107 Furthermore, strict judicial scrutiny of agency decisions 
may frustrate the agency's ability to carry out its mission effectively.108 
But whether by design or accident, Chevron provides a major route for 
the updating of statutes. 
It would be misleading to suggest that Chevron has left the courts 
defenseless in the face of imperialist, recalcitrant or renegade agencies. 
The Supreme Court, pursuing the new plain meaning, has been willing 
to overturn agency constructions that contradict the "express lan-
guage of the statute."109 Furthermore, Chevron itself includes lan-
guage that may be used by an aggressively originalist court to keep 
agencies in line. Recall that the case states that deference is not neces-
sary "if the intent of Congress is clear." A footnote elaborates as fol-
lows: "[I]f a court, employing traditional tools. of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect."110 
Some post-Chevron cases have understood this language as permitting 
a wide-ranging review of the legislative history to see if it shows "with 
sufficient clarity that the agency construction is contrary to the will of 
Congress." 111 
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia has viewed with alarm the willing-
ness of the Court to consult legislative history when reviewing agency 
actions. Since "the traditional tools of statutory construction" may 
readily be used to discover (or create) a congressional intent, an inten-
tionalist reading of Chevron "would make deference a doctrine of 
desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise 
107. 467 U.S. at 865. 
108. See, e.g., INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam) (recognizing broad authority 
in the Attorney General to define terms in a statutory provision providing for relief from depor-
tation and to fashion procedures for handling motions to reopen deportation proceedings). 
109. Bethesda Hosp. Assn. v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988). Other examples include 
FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Dept. of the Anny, 108 S. Ct. 1261 (1988), and INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). 
Two other factors blunt somewhat the updating power of Chevron. First, the Court has been 
willing to set aside some agency interpretations as "unreasonable," even though it has not con-
cluded that the intent of Congress on the precise question was clear. E.g., Board of Governors v. 
Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986). Second, a regularly cited canon of construction is 
that agency interpretations that have changed over time are entitled to Jess deference. See, e.g., 
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). (This canon, however, seems to be in tension 
with Chevron (Why should it matter if the agency interpretation is new, so long as it is a permis-
sible reading of the statute?).) 
110. 467 U.S. at 843 & n.9. 
111. Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Socy., 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) (upholding 
agency determination after examination of legislative history). For other cases where the Court 
has extensively reviewed legislative history, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) 
(rejecting agency interpretation), and Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985) (up-
holding agency interpretation). 
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be unable to construe the enactment at issue."112 Scalia's preferred 
reading of Chevron provides a minimalist role for courts: where the 
language is clear, the courts should apply the plain meaning; where it 
is not clear and an agency has offered an interpretation, the court 
should defer to the agency. 113 This approach, it should be apparent, is 
driven not by a normative principle supporting originalism, but by a 
concern about judicial activism. It is striking that in an attempt to 
limit policymaking by the judiciary, Scalia embraces that aspect of the 
practice of statutory interpretation most likely to be non-
originalistic.114 
III. TOWARDS A NAUTICAL APPROACH 
The previous section does not establish that modem statutory in-
terpretation, in theory or in practice, follows the nautical model. Most 
opinions display a decidedly archeological mind-set. Nevertheless 
nonoriginalism seems to exert a significant tug on statutory interpreta-
tion. Despite deeply ingrained notions of legislative supremacy, we 
seem to feel that statutes ought to be responsive to today's world. 
They ought to be made to fit, as best they can, into the current legal 
landscape.115 
Ronald Dworkin and William Eskridge have recently developed 
elaborate nonarcheological theories of interpretation.116 Their com-
plex and thoughtful analyses will not be recapitulated here. 117 This 
112. E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1225 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). See also NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413, at 
426 (1987). 
113. Another way to avoid judicial second-guessing of agency actions is to read expansively 
the APA provision precluding judicial review. See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988) 
(Scalia, J. ). 
114. The claim is not that Scalia's schema is incoherent (although one would think that 
adherence to a "plain meaning" approach would be intellectually unsatisfying). But the discus-
sion should come as a surprise to those who see Scalia as a raving originalist. He is not. He 
wants policy to be made by the political branches, not the courts - a view which sometimes 
supports orginalism (for example, in constitutional adjudication) and sometimes does not. 
115. Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 39, passim (describing social and legal context into which 
an interpretation of a statute should fit as the "legal topography," "legal landscape," or "the 
"fabric of the law"). 
116. R. DWORKIN, supra note 26, ch. 9; Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra 
note 14. For earlier nonoriginalist theories, see Radin, supra note 12; Curtis, supra note 10; 
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion To Determine Statutory Meaning: "The Middle Road'~· 
/, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 751 (1962). Dean Calabresi has argued for a "common law approach" to 
statutes in its strongest version: courts should be held to have the power to "overturn" outdated 
statutes. G. CALABRESI, supra note 39. 
117. Let me briefly contrast my approach with those of Dworkin and Eskridge. 
In an attempt to distinguish his theory of "law as integrity" from "pragmatism" (i.e., the 
view that judges "should make whatever decisions seem to them best for the community's future, 
not counting any form of consistency with the past as valuable for its own sake," R. DWORKIN, 
supra note 26, at 95), Dworkin asserts that an interpretation of a statute "must justify the story 
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section will show that a nautical approach to statutory interpretation 
is sensible and defensible. It may be best to start with an example. 
A. A Nautical Example: Exclusion of Homosexual Aliens Under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act 
In 1950, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a massive report 
analyzing the existing immigration system and proposing a compre-
hensive rewriting of the statute.118 One of its recommendations was 
that the grounds excluding persons on the basis of mental disease be 
amended to specify the exclusion of "homosexuals and other sex per-
verts." When the bill came up in the Senate the next year, the pro-
posed exclusion ground read: "aliens afflicted with psychopathic 
personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect." The Senate Report ex-
plained that "[t]he Public Health Service has advised that the provi-
sion for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality 
or a mental defect ... is sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion 
of homosexuals and sex perverts."119 
The Senate language was adopted, and the exclusion ground took 
its place among the other medical grounds for exclusion in section 
212(a) of the McCarran-Walter Act. As enacted, the first six (of 33) 
grounds of exclusion were: 
(1) Aliens who are feeble-minded; 
(2) Aliens who are insane; 
as a whole, not just its ending." Id. at 338. Consistent with his "chain novel" approach to 
common law and constitutional adjudication, he asks the judge to "make the best he can of [a 
statute's] continuing story." Id. at 348. Dworkin makes clear that this is not a demand that law 
"recapture ... the ideals or practical purposes of the politicians who created it"; law as integrity 
"commands a horizontal rather than vertical consistency of principle across the range of the legal 
standards the community now enforces." Id. at 227. My approach is similar, although it is less 
concerned with Dworkin's dimension of "fit" (that is, the telling of a story that harmonizes 
earlier interpretations into a coherent whole). "Fit" may be quite important in common law or 
nontextualist constitutional adjudication as a check on judicial inventiveness, but it seems less 
important with a statute that, because it is written, provides substantial limits on the range of 
possible interpretations. My proposal that we treat statutes as if they had been recently enacted 
requires a story of sorts - one that fits text, structure, purpose, and context into a horizontally 
consistent account. But earlier chapters need not be explained or apologized for. 
Eskridge describes a tripartite model that examines text, original legislative expectations, and 
evolution of the statute (including current context). He views the evolutionary element "as most 
important when the statutory text is not clear and the original legislative expectations have been 
overtaken by subsequent changes in society and law." Eskridge, supra note 14, at 1484. I would 
be inclined to carry out the textual analysis in a present-minded fashion, giving primary weight 
to the evolutionary perspective and little weight to the historical expectations of the enacting 
legislature. 
118. S. REP. No. 1515, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). For a detailed analysis oflaw and policy 
relating to the exclusion of homosexuals, see Note, The Propriety of Denying Entry to Homosex-
ual Aliens: Examining the Public Health Service's Authority over Medical Exclusions, 17 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 331 (1984). 
119. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951). 
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(3) Aliens who have had one or more attacks of insanity; 
(4) Aliens affticted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a 
mental defect; 
(5) Aliens who are narcotic drug addicts or chronic alcoholics; 
(6) Aliens who are affiicted with tuberculosis in any form, or with 
leprosy, or any dangerous contagious disease. 120 
In 1967, in Boutilier v. INS, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
phrase 'psychopathic personality' in the 1952 provision included 
homosexuals and that the phrase was not unconstitutionally vague.121 
The Court stated that "[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase 
'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals," and it specifically 
rejected the alien's claim that the term was "medically ambiguous": 
"[T]he test here is what Congress intended, not what differing psychia-
trists may think. It was not laying down a clinical test, but an exclu-
sionary standard which it declared to be inclusive of those having 
homosexual and perverted characteristics."122 
Two years before Boutilier, Congress had amended section 
212(a)(4) to include "sexual deviation" as a ground for exclusion. 
(Boutilier was based on the original provision and did not consider this 
phrase.) At that time, the relevant Senate report quoted the 1952 re-
port's statement that the failure to mention homosexuality explicitly in 
the statute should "not ... be construed in any way as modifying the 
intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates."123 Section 
212(a)(4) currently reads: "Aliens afflicted with psychopathic person-
ality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect." · 
The immigration act provides for medical examinations of aliens to 
determine whether they are excludable on medical grounds. Exams 
made in the United States are usually done by the Public Health Ser-
vice under the supervision of the Surgeon General. Until 1979, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service referred aliens suspected of 
being homosexuals to the P.H.S. for examination. In that year, the 
Surgeon General announced that the P.H.S. would no longer carry out 
such examinations because (1) "according to 'current and generally 
accepted canons of medical practice', homosexuality per se is no longer 
considered to be a mental disorder"; and (2) "the determination of 
homosexuality is not made through a medical diagnostic 
120. 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952). 
121. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
122. 387 U.S. at 120, 124. 
123. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951), quoted in S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. 19 (1965). 
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procedure."124 
Assume that a homosexual alien appears at the border today and 
applies for admission, arguing that section 212(a)(4) should not be 
read to exclude him. Does he- have a good case? The archeological 
interpreter would no doubt be startled by the claim. From an original-
ist perspective, the case for exclusion appears overwhelming.125 Con-
gress twice and the Supreme Court once has said that the statute 
excludes homosexuals. 
But suppose we start the analysis a different way. Suppose we treat 
the statute as if it had been enacted yesterday and try to make sense of 
it in today's world. We might pursue this present-minded analysis by 
asking the following kinds of questions. Would a reader of the statute 
today be likely to think it requires the exclusion of homosexuals? Why 
would a legislature enact this law? What could it have been trying to 
accomplish? If a legislature today sought to exclude aliens based on 
their sexual orientation, would it be likely to choose the words of the 
statute to do so? If the statute is read to exclude homosexuals, how 
would we then be inclined to state the objective of the statute? Would 
this reformulated purpose cover other cases that the words would lead 
us to believe ought to be covered? Would this reformulated purpose 
make us understand the words in a new way? If read to cover homo-
sexual aliens, how would the statute fit with other laws on the books? 
Does such an interpretation appear consistent with broader prevailing 
common law and constitutional norms? 
These questions, for the most part, should appear familiar. They 
are the stuff of statutory interpretation as practiced in our legal sys-
tem. What is missing is talk of original intent, and what is added is a 
distinct present-mindedness. By treating the statute as if it had been 
enacted recently, we are attempting to weave it into today's legal sys-
124. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting a report of the Surgeon 
General's decision in 56 INTERP. REL. 387, 398 (1979)) (footnote omitted). · 
The Surgeon General's new policy presented problems for the INS, which was unsure 
whether it could exclude aliens on medical grounds without a medical inspection. The courts of 
appeals have split on this issue. Compare Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (medical inspection needed 
for exclusion), with Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 
1219 (1984) (no exam necessary for determi.nation of excludability). 
125. Although clever originalist arguments can be made to the contrary. For example: (1) 
Congress intended the ground to be a.medical exclusion ground; once the medical authorities no 
longer consider homosexuality a medical disease, the ground no longer applies (much as if sci-
ence now decided that syphilis is not a contagious disease, and therefore persons afflicted with 
the disease should not be excludable under § 212(a)(6) (dangerous contagious diseases)). See 
Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Commn. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 585 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("once· 
medical authorities decided that homosexuality per se was no longer a medical problem of any 
type, the court cannot ascribe to Congress an intention that homosexuals still be excluded from 
entry"); (2) By asking the P.H.S. to undertake medical examinations, Congress implicitly dele-
gated to the P.H.S. the power to determine the scope of the exclusions. 
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tern, to make it responsive to today's conditions. We are seeking, for 
lack of a better term, synchronic coherence.126 
A nautical interpreter ought to begin by noticing that the statute 
nowhere mentions homosexuality, and the phrase "psychopathic per-
sonality" does not spring to mind as a ready category into which to 
place it. "Sexual deviation" might well include homosexuality. But 
how should we decide if it does or does not? The location of the exclu-
sion ground appears particularly significant; it is placed among the 
other medical exclusion grounds in section 212(a). Thus the structure 
of the current Act suggests that the paragraph might be limited to 
medically diagnosable diseases. This view is supported by the detailed 
provision relating to medical examinations by the P.H.S. which specif-
ically refers to section 212(a)(4).127 Stated another way, the statutory 
language and structure suggest a current purpose to exclude persons 
with either physical or mental medical problems. 
If the position of the highest medical officer of the United States 
government (which is charged with enforcement of the immigration 
laws) is that homosexuality per se is not a disease, and if that opinion 
is now the accepted view of the medical and psychiatric professions, 12s 
then it would not be unreasonable to conclude that homosexuality 
ought not to be considered a medical ground of exclusion. 129 That is, 
treating the statute as if recently enacted, one might well decide that 
section 212(a)(4) is limited to medical exclusions, and exclusion on the 
basis of homosexuality would not readily come within it. This inter-
pretation does not read the phrase "sexual deviation" out of the stat-
ute; it limits the term to "deviations" that are currently considered 
pathological (perhaps pedophilia or exhibitionism). 130 
126. For similar concepts see Eskridge, supra note 93, at 116 (1988) ("horizontal con-
tinuity"); R. DWORKIN, supra note 26, at 338 (interpreter must construct justification that fits 
and flows through the statute and is, if possible, consistent with other legislation in force); Brink, 
Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 129-33 
(1988) (what law requires is that decision that coheres best with existing legal principles, consti-
tutional provisions, statutes, and precedents). 
127. See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 234, 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982). 
128. See 56 INTERP. REL. 387, 398 (1979) (reprinting Surgeon General's statement that re-
ferred to views of the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Associa-
tion, the American Public Health Association, and the American Nurses' Association). 
129. This conclusion would be strengthened if homosexual activity were considered constitu-
tionally protected. The Supreme Court recently said it was not in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986). But growing acceptance of homosexual behavior might cut in the other direction. 
130. It might be asked why I would not put great weight - even conclusive weight- on the 
fact that many Americans may consider homosexuality "sexual deviation" (that is, conduct that 
differs from the norm). See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sod-
omy statute as applied to homosexual behavior; "majority sentiments about the morality of ho-
mosexuality" sufficient to supply rational basis for law). This question, which neatly identifies 
the difference between my approach and a present-minded plain meaning approach, is discussed 
in Part 111.B infra. 
October 1988] Updating Statutory Interpretation 51 
This is pretty strong stuff to the archeologist. Not only does the 
nautical interpretation violate the clearly expressed intent of the enact-
ing legislators, but it also overturns a decision of the Supreme Court. 
This requires a few words about stare decisis. 
Under traditional rules, statutory precedents are not lightly over-
ruled. The usual justification is that Congress can, if it so chooses, 
reverse a judicial interpretation of a statute. The interests of stability, 
predictability, efficiency, consistency and reliance - indeed, the idea 
of a rule of law- are said to be at stake when courts too easily reverse 
statutory precedents.131 These arguments figure prominently in Jus-
tice Stevens' opinion in Runyon, and also in his dissent from the order 
requesting reargument in Patterson. 132 Not surprisingly, civil rights 
groups opposed to the overruling of Runyon place substantial weight 
on the principle of stare decisis. 
How should stare decisis affect the exclusion case? Even under the 
traditional doctrine, a plausible argument can be made that Boutilier 
(the case holding that homosexuals are excludable under section 
. 212(a)(4)) should be reversed. It would be difficult for the government 
- the prevailing party - to claim that it has relied to any great extent 
on the case. Only a handful of aliens were ever excluded under the 
provision. More importantly, after the Surgeon General announced 
that the P.H.S. would no longer conduct medical examinations to test 
for homosexuality, the Department of Justice adopted a policy that 
severely restricted application of the exclusion ground. Under current 
policy, arriving aliens are not asked any question regarding their sex-
ual preference. Only if an alien makes an unambiguous oral or written 
admission of homosexuality, or another arriving alien, without 
prompting, identifies an alien as homosexual will the exclusion process 
be triggered. 133 In short, the Executive Branch has all but repealed 
the exclusion through administrative practice. The Justice Depart-
ment policy is known to Congress, which has taken no action to 
change it. In fact, bills have been introduced to repeal the exclusion 
ground.134 While it would be difficult to conclude that Congress has 
"ratified" the administrative action, it is fair to say that the momen-
tum in Congress is towards repeal. 
For similar reasons, the stability, predictability, and consistency 
131. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). See generally Eskridge, 
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. REV. 1361 (1988). 
132. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-23 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
133. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983). 
134. E.g., H.R. 1119, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
52 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:20 
interests look weak. Most Americans are unaware of the exclusion 
ground, and arriving gay and lesbian aliens know that they will be 
admitted to the United States if they simply don't identify their sexual 
preference. 
The principle roadblock, of course, is intentionalism. Given the 
clear congressional intent to exclude homosexuals, an archeological 
Court could hardly find that it had made a "mistake" in Boutilier. 
Nor do legal or social conditions appear to have changed enough to 
compel an archeological court to forgo original intent. But these con-
clusions follow from the interpretive theory used to decide the case, 
not the role of precedent. My claim here is that if the Court were to 
adopt a nautical approach, concerns about stare decisis need not stand 
in its way in reconsidering Boutilier. 
I should make clear that a nonoriginalist approach does not reject 
the idea of precedent. Stability, predictability, and reliance are terribly 
important norms of our legal system. Thus, under a nautical ap-
proach, a court may well reach a result following precedent that it 
would not reach if it were considering the question for the first time. 
But it should be clear that such an approach would not accord statu-
tory precedents the current "super-strong presumption."135 The value 
that a nautical approach places on current coherence in the law would 
inform its stance towards precedent. 
I have focussed on the "psychopathic personality" /"sexual devia-
tion" exclusion ground because that is the provision upon which inten-
tionalists rely for concluding that homosexuals are excludable. But 
there is another part of the exclusion provision that must be addressed 
from a nautical perspective. Section 212(a) includes the following sub-
set of exclusion grounds: 
(11) Aliens who are polygamists or who practice polygamy or advocate 
the practice of polygamy; · 
(12) Aliens who are prostitutes or who have engaged in prostitution, or 
aliens coming to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to 
engage in prostitution; ... 
(13) Aliens coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sex-
ual act. 
Interestingly, under an archeological analysis, this provision pro-
vides no problem for homosexuals. The legislative history of the 1952 
Act shows that an earlier proposed version of the paragraph provided 
for the exclusion of "[a]liens coming to the United States solely, princi-
pally, or incidentally to engage in any illicit sexual act or any other 
135. This is Professor Eskridge's phrase. Eskridge, supra note 131. 
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immoral act." 136 Since Congress deleted the italicized language, the 
administrative authorities concluded early on that the provision con-
demned only those aliens coming for the purpose of engaging in im-
moral sexual behavior; that is, it did not cover the alien who sought 
entry to the United States in order to work and who happened to be 
living with a woman not his wife. 137 Nor would the act be read, there-
fore, to exclude from the U.S. a persons whose homosexuality is inci-
dental to his reasons for entering the country. 
But might not the present-minded interpreter conclude that para-
graph (13) demands exclusfon of homosexuals? One cannot plausibly 
claim that the three grounds deal with medical problems; they seem 
clearly to be about conduct considered immoral. And while homosex-
uality may now be tolerated in parts of the United States, it is clear 
that a substantial number of Ainericans continue to consider homo-
sexual behavior unacceptable on moral groqnds. Just recently, in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a Georgia sodomy statute as applied to consensual homosexual acts. 
It noted that some twenty-five states have sodomy laws on the books, 
and concluded that the State's belief that "homosexual sodomy is im-
moral and unacceptable" provided a rational basis for the law. 138 
It thus seems plausible (even if deplorable, from my point of view) 
that a current Congress could exclude homosexµals; and it might 
choose general language ("any immoral sexual act") to do so, in order 
to cover other kinds of sexual behavior deemed morally unacceptable 
today. It would be difficult to argue that exclusion of homosexuals is 
wildly out of step with current social values and legal doctrine. 
Arguing against exclusion of homosexuals is the language and 
structure of the statute and issues of administrability pf the exclusion 
ground. Read together, the three paragraphs quoted above clearly dis-
tinguish between status (aliens "who are polygamists"; aliens "who 
are prostitutes") and purposive behavior (aliens who are coming "to 
engage in prostitution"; aliens who are coming "to engage in any im-
moral act"). Furthermore, paragraph (12) includes the qualifier "inci-
dentally" (to engage in prostitution), while paragraph (13) does not. 
Together, these cues suggest that paragraph (13) ought to be read to 
condemn only those aliens who are seeking entry for the purpose of 
engaging in immoral sexual activity. This interpretation would not 
make homosexuality per se a ground of exclusion. For most homosex-
136. S. 3455, 8lst Cong., quoted in Matter ofB., 5 I.& N. Dec. 185, 188 (BIA 1953) (empha-
sis in original opinion). 
137. Matter of B., 5 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 1953). 
138. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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uals, their sexual orientation would only be incidental to their entry. 
Under this reading, we would state the purpose of the provision as 
excluding aliens who enter primarily for the purpose of engaging in 
immoral sexual acts. 
Furthermore, an interpretation of paragraph (13) that covers "inci-
dental" sexual conduct may produce troubling consequences in en-
forcement of its provisions. Because of the vagueness of the word 
"immoral," a broad interpretation of the exclusion ground vests dan-
gerous censorial power in agencies not known for their tolerance of 
deviant behavior. The statute could arguably be enforced against mar-
ried couples who practice oral sex or unmarried heterosexual couples 
who cohabitate. Current constitutional protections of privacy ought 
to make a court pause before adopting an interpretation that would 
exclude aliens for such acts undertaken "incidental" to entry. 139 Re-
stricting the provision to aliens who enter in order to pursue immoral 
activities does not eliminate the problem of defining "immoral sexual 
act," but it substantially limits the area within which such judgments 
would have to be made.140 
For me the case is close (closer than it would be were I an archeol-
ogist), but I would hold that the provision does not exclude aliens sim-
ply on the ground that they are homosexual. Of course, the case for 
not excluding homosexuals under paragraph (13) would be much 
stronger - from the nautical perspective - if homosexuality were no 
longer considered "immoral" behavior. But until Bowers v. Hardwick 
is overruled, it would be difficult for a court to so conclude. Yet this 
fact is not controlling. A nautical approach is an interpretive model. 
The task is not to make current policy judgments or to ask how the 
current legislature would decide the issue today, but to make sense of a 
statute's language and structure in light of the current social and legal 
context. 
B. Other Approaches Contrasted 
Unlike the Hart and Sacks methodology, the proposed nautical ap-
proach would not place at the center of the analysis the actual "mis-
139. A further consideration might be the consistent administrative interpretation, since en-
actment of the provision, that the provision does not exclude aliens for "incidental" behavior. 
However, where such an interpretation is based on an archeological reading, it should carry less 
weight in a nautical approach. 
140. Cf United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2763 (1988), where the Court rejected 
the government's argument that a statute criminalizing involuntary servitude should be read to 
cover compulsion through psychological coercion: "(T]he Government's interpretation would 
delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of 
coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimes. It would 
also subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction." 
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chief" that the enacting legislature sought to overcome. The history 
of the enactment might be important in giving the interpreter a sense 
of the area in which the statute operates, and the legislative reports 
and debates may provide examples of the meaning that the statutory 
words might bear.141 Often, a generalist interpreter hasn't the foggiest 
idea of what a technical statute is all about; the legislative history pro-
vides a window on the specialist world. But such information would 
not be privileged in any sense, and certainly would not constitute the 
Holy Grail of statutory interpretation.142 
An "original meaning" approach is obviously inconsistent with my 
nautical model. However, an advocate of nonarcheological plain 
meaning might argue that he or she can serve the goals of present-
mindedness without introducing judicial willfulness. As applied to the 
medical exclusion ground, the advocate might argue: "My dictionary 
(and common parlance) defines 'deviation' as 'noticeable or marked 
departure from accepted norms of behavior.'143 While homosexuality 
may be tolerated in parts of the United States, it has certainly not yet 
become an accepted norm of behavior. Homosexual marriage is pro-
hibited in most states, and the Supreme Court recently upheld a Geor-
gia sodomy statute as applied to homosexual behavior. The Court 
found that the 'belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that 
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable' provided a rational 
basis for the law.144 Given all this, how can even a nautical interpreter 
conclude that a statute's condemnation of 'sexual deviance' does not 
today require the exclusion of homosexuals?" 
This line of reasoning demonstrates the weakness, not the strength, 
of the new plain meaning. One might well share the concern that 
drives the new plain meaning - the use and abuse of legislative his-
tory. But plain meaning, it seems to me, can never be an adequate 
theory of interpretation. As noted above, plain meaning is primarily a 
strategy for restraining the judiciary and reforming legislatures. It is 
141. This flips Hart and Sacks, who would have consulted post-enactment interpretation for 
evidence of the meaning that the language would bear. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 21, at 
1416. 
142. "[T]he quest is not properly for the sense originally intended by the statute, .•• but 
rather for the sense which can be quarried out. of it in light of the new situation." Llewellyn, 
supra note 22, at 400 (emphasis in original). Cf Posner, Skepticism, supra note 30, at 845-46 
(precedents as information, not authority). ' 
143. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 309 (1981). 
144. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Burger stated that condemnation of homosexual conduct "is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian 
moral and ethical standards" and that "[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow 
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." 478 U.S. 
at 196-97. 
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not interested in searching for a sensible reading of a statute, 145 one 
that would seek either to further the project begun by the enacting 
legislature or to weave the statute into the warp and woof of the legal 
system. 146 By declaring conventional meaning to be legal meaning, a 
plain meaning approach is anti-interpretive. It isolates a particular in-
stance of legal language, stripping it of its connections to the legal 
enterprise of which it is a part.141 
C. In Defense of the Nautical Model 
Despite the established nonoriginalist elements in common law 
and constitutional adjudication, something rubs us the wrong way 
about nautical models of statutory interpretation. The legislature did 
something back then, our intuitions tell us, and until they act again it 
is not up to the courts (or any interpreter) to update the law.148 To 
update is to usurp the legislature's job, to violate important notions of 
legislative supremacy and separation of powers, to undermine the rule 
oflaw. Warren Lehman has, with irony, identified the allure of inten-
tionalism: "we know no better way to express the ideas of sovereignty 
and legitimacy."149 
Perhaps somewhat curiously, it is possible to defend a nautical ap-
proach in intentionalist terms. The court that resolutely applies the 
original intent of the legislation (assuming we abide by the fiction) is 
often disserving that legislature. By leaving issues for subsequent in-
terpreters, the legislature has necessarily recognized that it needs help 
145. For an incomprehensible application of the plain meaning rule, see United States v. 
Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). There, the Court read literally a federal statute requiring that speci-
fied mining claims to federal land be filed "prior to December 31." Thus, the stakeholders who 
filed on December 31 were held to have forfeited their claims to the government. This rigid 
application of plain meaning (if the statute can be said to be "plain") serves no reasonable objec-
tive, other than to trap the unwary. 
146. See also Farber & Frickey, supra note 48, at 459-60 (interpreter who ignores elected 
drafter's intent "strains the chain of legitimacy from the electorate to the drafter and then to the 
implementor''). 
Justice Scalia's interpretive theory is not a simple-minded version of plain meaning. He rec-
ognizes that much legal language is not "plain," and therefore he often examines other aspects of 
the legal 'landscape to see how the statute might sensibly be read. The nautical approach 
sketched in this essay is sympathetic to this part of Scalia's methodology. It would never, how-
ever, declare statutory language "plain" and then end the analysis. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
147. Cf. Brink, supra note 126, at 121 (rejecting semantic theory underlying plain meaning 
approach that identifies meaning with the set of properties or descriptions conventionally 
associated with the word or phrase). 
148. Cf. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 376 (1981): "Our 
legal grundnorm [in constitutional Jaw] has been that the body politic can at a specific point in 
time definitively order relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on all organs of govern-
ment until changed by amendment." (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) 
149. Lehman, How To Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489, 501. 
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in making the statute work in unproVided-for cases. An interpretation 
that makes no sense in today's world, even if it accurately reflects orig-
inal meaning, can hardly be said to "work" today. 
But it would be overstating the case to say that updating statutes is 
always consistent with the intent of the enacting legislature. If public 
choice theory is correct, groups that have bargained their way to a 
statutory result may be quite interested in maintaining their gains irre-
spective of changes elsewhere in the legal system. Thus, nautical mod-
els must ultimately be defended on other than intentionalist grounds. 
Nautical models are built on an understanding of the nature of 
statutes and the role of interpreters that is fundamentally different 
from the view that underlies an archeological approach. Archeologists 
see statutes as once-shouted commands that continue simply to echo 
through time. Current readers of the statute are not interpreters; they 
are receivers of messages, capturing and recording the communication 
precisely as it was uttered long ago. This is a singularly inapt descrip-
tion of statutes and interpreters. Enactment of a statute represents the 
beginning of a journey, not the end. 150 The statute "means" nothing 
until it takes its place in the legal system, until it begins to interact 
with judges, lawyers, administrators, and lay people. Each of these 
interactions changes, or fills out, the meaning of the statute. In decid-
ing that an exclusion provision does (or does not) apply to homosexu-
als, we have made the statute something other than what it was before 
we picked it up. We have not applied the statute, as if it were a pre-
existing, self-contained, unchangeable thing; we have operated within 
the statute, done something to it - we have interpreted it. Interpret-
ers are not reporters or historians, searching out the facts of the past. 
They are creators of meaning.151 
This view of statutes is not necessarily inconsistent with an 
originalist approach. · A thoughtful archeologist recognizes that the 
profession is not about just digging up old pots; it is concerned with 
recreating and understanding the culture of which the pots are evi-
dence. That is, the archeological process can attempt to give meaning 
to artifacts, rather than simply put them in a museum. 
Thus a nautical approach must offer something more than simply a 
150. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 26, at 313, 348-50. 
151. See Witherspoon, The Essential Focus of Statutory Interpretation, 36 IND. L.J. 423, 441 
(1961): 
[T]he court is not an interpreter whose function is merely to discover the historical meaning 
of language used in statutory rules and to apply these rules as so interpreted to individual 
cases. More accurately the court is engaged in assignment of meaning to statutes or in 
making statutes meaningful for administration. This involves attribution of purpose to stat-
utes and in discovery, or more accurately, development and evolving of statutory principles 
in light of these purposes and relevant administrative standards. 
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richer description of statutory interpretation. It must defend present-
mindedness. To do so, it can begin with some very simple ideas that 
are universally recognized. Law is a tool for arranging today's social 
relations and expressing today's social values; and we fully expect our 
laws, no matter when enacted, to speak to us today'. Statutes compiled 
in the United States Code are not color-coded based on date of enact-
ment. Each is viewed as a present statement of the law and treated as 
such. When a person who has suffered racial discrimination in em-
ployment goes to federal court for relief, section 1981 and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are of equal authority in remedying civil 
rights violations even though the latter statute was enacted almost a 
century later. Charles Curtis has described how the past and present 
come together as follows: 
As soon as a statute is enacted, it joins the rest of the law, and together 
with all the rest it speaks to the judge at the moment he decides the case. 
When it is enacted, to be sure, it was a command, uttered at a certain 
time in certain circumstances, but it became more than that. It became a 
part of the law which is now telling the judge, with the case before him 
and a decision confronting him, what he should now do. And isn't this 
just what the legislature wanted? The legislature had fashioned the stat-
ute, not for any immediate occasion, but for an indefinite number of oc-
casions to arise in an indefinite future, until it was repealed or 
amended. 152 
. There is another dimension implicit in a nautical approach beyond 
simply understanding law as an enterprise that exists in the present. It 
is the project described by Hart and Sacks of fitting the statute into the 
current legal system as a whole - what I have called above syn-
chronic coherence. 
The case for coherence is based, in part, on traditional legal values 
of fairness and equality (treating like cases alike) and - perhaps sur-
prisingly - notice (that is, lay persons consulting the statute may be 
more likely to read it in light of current understandings than by 
searching out the legislative history and the state of the law at the time 
of enactment). Most significantly, consistency in the present is impor-
tant because we recognize that fundamental understandings, such as 
right and wrong, entitlement, responsibility, fairness, and duty, lie be-
hind every aspect of our legal system. These notions provide a back-
drop for legislative and judicial behavior, providing norms to be taken 
into account in making decisions and standards for judging the appro-
priateness of decisions. To fit statutes into the overall fabric of the law 
is to make them reflect, to make them responsive to, these evolving 
background norms. To the extent that archeological approaches aim 
152. Curtis, supra note 10, at 415. 
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at describing another time they risk undermining the moral force nec-
essary to legitimate current positive law. 
Finally, there is an important way in which law does more than 
simply fulfill present-mindness purposes. As Robert Cover has noted, 
law creates, and is part of, a normative universe. It is "a bridge link-
ing a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative."153 When we 
decide whether our immigration law excludes homosexuals from the 
United States, we are implicitly making a statement about the kind of 
world we live in and want to live in. These judgments are complex 
and controversial. But we cannot even begin to approach them sensi-
bly through an archeological analysis, which can only present us with 
images of the past rather than visions of a normative present and 
future. 154 
It must be stressed that an interpretive approach based on a nauti-
cal understanding of statutes does not ask an interpreter to keep a 
statute "up to date" in the sense of predicting how a current legisla-
ture would answer the statutory question. The nautical approach sug-
gests a process of interpretation that uses familiar tools of statutory 
construction - the language, structure, and purpose of a statute, re-
lated statutory provisions, and prevailing common law and constitu-
tional norms. What the nautical approach demands is that the process 
of interpretation be carried out in a present-minded fashion, as if the 
statute had been recently enacted. 
Archeologists would no doubt have a number of criticisms of the 
defense of a nautical model just sketched. They might begin by charg-
ing that it ill-behooves the nonoriginalist to base his or her case on 
claims about legitimacy. Legitimacy is maintained, the argument 
might go, not by allowing willful judges to update the law, but by 
respecting legislative supremacy (and therefore democratjc govern-
ment). This argument, although frequently repeated, strikes me as cu-
rious. The archeological claim cannot be that we hope that we are 
ruled by the meanings of the past; it must be that we would rather be 
so ruled than subjected to the policymaking of unelected judges. 155 
But this is certainly a false dichotomy. Archeological methods are 
hardly exact and objective; nor, given the ability of legislatures to ma-
nipulate legislative history, are they guaranteed to represent majority 
153. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 91 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 9 (1983). 
154. See J.B. White, supra note 13, at 266-67. 
155. One aspect of updating may well be viewed as unfair or illegitimate: to apply a new rule 
to a transaction that was crafted under an earlier reading of the statute. Notions of fair notice 
and reliance run deep in our law. But these concerns can be handled within a nonarcheological 
model by giving altogether new interpretations prospective effect. 
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views of the legislature or the electorate. Furthermore, as the example 
above tries to show, nautical interpretation is not unconstrained judi-
cial activity. It does not ask the interpreter to undertake the legislative 
task of devising public policy. It is a demand that the interpretive 
process be present-minded. 
Few would deny that we expect our laws to be up to date and as 
consistent as possible with other laws and with underlying legal and 
moral principles. Indeed, we accept nonoriginalism in constitutional 
law for precisely these reasons, even though there the expectations ig-
nored are those of a supermajority of the states as well as a majority of 
both houses of the federal legislature. Constitutional nonoriginalism is 
all the more striking when one factors in the difficulty of "correcting" 
a decision by the Supreme Court. Of course, some Justices and com-
mentators condemn the Court's excursions into nontextual analysis. 156 
And much of the current support for constitutional originalism is 
based on a desire to rein in overzealous judges. 157 But these com-
plaints about constitutional interpretation - whatever their merit -
do not apply with much force in statutory interpretation. 
It is crucial to see that while nautical models of statutory interpre-
tation may be openly nonarcheo/ogica/, they are not nontextual. The 
approach suggested here, similar to other nautical approaches, attrib-
utes meaning to printed words written by the enacting legislature. 158 
Ultimately the question is, what is the most plausible meaning today 
that these words will bear. Of course, this calls for judgment, and in-
terpreters have a wide range of sources they may consult. Nonethe-
less, the fact that the statute is written - at least as measured against 
the range of possible actions that may be taken to solve a social prob-
lem - provides a significant restraint on judges. 
Other objections can be lodged against my defense of nautical ap-
proaches. One may question whether our legal system is or ever can 
be fully coherent. Critical legal scholarship has powerfully demon-
strated that in virtually every area of law, inconsistent or contradic-
tory background principles fight for dominance. To find coherence 
may be simply to privilege one underlying principle over another, 
156. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution. 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976). 
157. E.g., Address of Attorney General Edwin Meese III before the American Bar Associa· 
tion, July 9, 1985, reprinted in THE.GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONST!· 
TUTION (Federalist Society, 1986), at 9 ("A jurisprudence seriously aimed at the explication of 
original intention would produce defensible principles of government that would not be tainted 
by ideological predilection."). 
158. Thus, relevant constitutional analogy is not Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (expanding coverage of Equal Protection Clause beyond race to 
gender). 
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oft~n in service of existing social relationships that distribute power. 
But on the level of resolving disputes, it may well be possible to iden-
tify which of the competing principles is currently salient in the legal 
system as a whole. For example, in the Patterson case, we can readily 
identify two conflicting norms of our legal system: an anti-discrimina-
tion norm and a freedom of association norm. Yet there can be little 
doubt that in today's world the anti-discrimination norm trumps the 
associational norm in the employment context. 
It might also be claimed that a nautical approach sacrifices the 
benefits of an interpretive tradition: rather than trying to connect up 
to a historical chain of interpretations, a nautical approach will plunk 
down present-minded interpretations helter-skelter with no respect for 
the smooth, evolutionary development of legal doctrine. This criti-
cism, however, neglects the extent to which the past is reflected in the 
present. "We shall have a false view of the landscape," Cardozo 
wrote, "if we look at the waste spaces only, and refuse to see the acres 
already sown and fruitful." 159 The synchronic coherence sought by a 
nautical interpreter will take into account existing an9 well-established 
doctrines which will necessarily be represented in the current legal 
landscape. Furthermore, nautical models are not likely to create great 
instability and unpredictability in the law. To ~e sure, nonoriginalism 
produces doctrinal change, but both the common law and constitu-
tional law seem to achieve both a reasonable degree of certainty and an 
ability to respond to new social conditions. It is not obvious why stat-
utory law could not do the same. 
So far, I have tried to build a case for a nautical model of statutory 
interpretation. The approach I have sketched would treat statutes as if 
they were enacted yesterday and would refuse to make the search for 
original intent the central interpretive task. This is not, however, a 
complete theory of statutory interpretation. I have not considered the 
role that reliance, legislative acquiesence, stare decisis, the age of a 
statute, or agency action ought to play. Nor have I discussed how one 
can make coherent a statute whose parts have been interpreted at dif-
ferent times under different conditions. These topics must await an-
other day. My limited purpose is to demonstrate that one can, and 
should, start the interpretive analysis in the present, not the past.160 
159. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921). 
160. An additional question is how my approach would apply to recent statutes. It should be 
evident that I share the concerns of Justice Scalia about legislative history (abuse by the legisla-
tures and overuse by the courts); thus I would try to understand a statute primarily based on its 
words, structure and other aspects of the legal and social context. This is what I tried to do in 
the example in the text in the previous section. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: RECONSIDERING RUNYON 
In Brown v. Board of Education, the greatest civil rights case of 
modern constitutional law, Chief Justice Warren wrote, "In approach-
ing [ segregatfon in public schools] we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was written, or even to 1896 
when Plessy v. ]?erguson was written. We must consider public educa-
tion in the light of its full development and its present place in Ameri-
can life throughout the Nation."161 
There is a wonderful, appropriate, double meaning in Warren's 
language. The briefs on reargument in Brown had displayed the pre-
dictable difference of opinion about the original intent of the Four-
teenth Amendment; 162 and Warren's opinion noted that while the 
original "sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the prob-
lem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive."163 
Thus, the Court is unable to turn the clock back. 
But perhaps more importantly, the "cannot" has a normative 
sense. It would be wrong to decide a case of such fundamental impor-
tance·- a case that penetrates to the core of a society's moral fiber -
based on the views of another century. The constitutional law of race 
discrimination must speak to us (and about us) today. As has been 
repeatedly noted in this article, nonoriginalism is well-ingrained in 
constitutional law. Indeed, the lesson of the defeat of the nomination 
of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court may be that an originalist juris-
prudence is inconsistent wjth popular understandings of the norms for 
constitutional adjudication. 
A nautical model of statutory interpretation makes the same 
claims against an archeological theory of statutory meaning. Agreeing 
with the Realists of half a century ago, the model seriously doubts the 
coherence of a concept of "original intention"; and like the new plain 
meaning, it is concerned about current legislative practice that occurs 
in an intentionalist world. Yet it accepts neither the solution of policy 
analysis nor "plain meaning." Nautical models see interpreters as 
supplying important direction to the development of law in a complex, 
161. 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). 
162. John W. Davis, who reargued Brown on behalf of the school boards, summarized the 
differing conclusions about original intent as follows: 
Now, your honors then are presented with this: we say there is no warrant for the assertion 
that the Fourteenth Amendment dealt with the school question. The appellants say that 
from the debates in Congress it is perfectly evident that the Congress wanted to deal with 
the school question, and the Attorney General, as a friend of the court, says he does not 
know which is correct. So your honors are afforded a reasonable field for selection. 
Quoted in R. KLuGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 671 (1975). 
163. 347 U.S. at 489. 
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changing society. Courts (and agencies) serve, but are not subservient 
to, legislatures. Together, drafters and interpreters create a legal 
system. 
The theory of statutory interpretation proposed here suggests a 
fairly clear answer to the question on which the Court has requested 
reargument in Patterson. Let's put the issue of stare decisis to the side 
by assuming that Runyon had not been decided, and see how the nau-
tical approach would analyze the issue of whether section 1981 applies 
to private action. 
Section 1981 provides: "All persons ... shall have the same right 
. . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 
The "plain" language of the section (not surprisingly) does not an-
swer the question of whether it applies to acts of private discrimina-
tion. It is arguable that use of the word "right," combined with the 
kinds of discrimination prohibited (involving legal proceedings), sug-
gests a "state action" limitation. But the language of the statute may 
be contrasted with the Fourteenth Amendment ("nor shall any State 
. . . deny") and other civil rights statutes that are clearly limited to 
governmental discrimination. For example, section 1983 provides, 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage of any State, ... [deprives a person] of any rights, 
privileges or immunities ... shall be liable to the party injured .... " 164 
On the other hand, other civil rights laws appear, on their face, to 
cover acts of private discrimination. The public accommodations sec-
tion of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states: "All persons shall be entitled 
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accom-
modation ... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of 
race." 165 The language of section 1981 seems to fall between these 
poles. 
What purposes can be attributed to the protections afforded by the 
statute? When combined with section 1982, the provision seems quite 
clearly aimed at guaranteeing that race not be a factor that prevents 
blacks from participating in society, living and working, on the same 
terms as whites. To be sure, such restrictions may be the product of 
official action, and modern civil rights laws would be justified in con-
demning such conduct. But it is also clear that private discrimination 
164. 42 u.s.c. § 1983. 
165. 42 u.s.c. § 2000a. 
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puts tremendous obstacles in the way of opportunities for minorities. 
Would it be sensible for the scheme of civil rights laws today to set its 
face against public but not private discrimination? 
Certainly the evidence runs the other way. The 1964 and 1968 
Civil Rights Acts expressly attacked private discrimination in public 
accommodations, employment and housing. And the Supreme Court 
has made clear that private discrimination in some contexts is wholly 
inconsistent with public policy. In Bob Jones University v. United 
States, the Court upheld a ruling of the I.RS. that denied tax-exempt 
stat.us to a private school that practiced racial discrimination.166 
"[E]ntitlement to tax exemption," wrote Chief Justice Burger, "de-
pends on meeting certain common law standards of charity - namely, 
that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public pur-
pose and not be contrary to established public policy." Recognizing 
that "determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive 
matters with serious implications for the institution affected," the 
Court adopted a test quite favorable to the entity seeking tax-exempt 
status: "a declaration that a given institution is not 'charitable' should 
be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is 
contrary to fundamental public policy." Nonetheless, the Court had 
no trouble concluding that racial discrimination in education violates 
"deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice" and "funda-
mental national policy."167 
Few could deny that ending racial discrimination - both public 
and private - is fundamental national policy. 168 But it might be 
claimed that reading section 1981 to cover acts of private discrimina-
tion would upset the carefully crafted scheme (including complex en-
forcement provisions) that Congress has enacted in recent years 
prohibiting only certain discriminatory conduct. For example, in the 
employment context, section 1981 has been interpreted to permit re-
covery of damages not authorized under Title VII, such as punitive 
damages and damages for mental distress. 169 Whatever merit this ar-
gument has in areas specifically covered by recent detailed civil rights 
laws, 170 it would be wrong to allow it to determine the broader ques-
166. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
167. 461 U.S. at 586, 592, 593. 
168. 461 U.S. at 595 ("Few social or political issues in our history have been more vigorously 
debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination ..•• "). 
169. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (punitive damages); 
Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 660 F.2d 1267, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1981) (damages for mental 
distress). 
170. This is not to suggest that the mere existence of a specific statute automatically limits 
coverage of a general civil rights statute. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 
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tion of whether section 1981 reaches any private discrimination. 
There are large areas of private commercial activity not regulated by 
civil rights laws enacted in this century. Nothing in the 1964 or 1968 
Civil Rights Acts would condemn a day care center's decision to deny 
a place to a black child, a private nursing home's policy of not admit-
ting black patients (provided neither received federal funds), or a 
bookshop's refusal to serve customers on the basis of their race. 171 My 
guess is that these gaps in protection would startle most Americans; 
most would believe that such conduct "must be against the law." 
Runyon provides a particularly important example. There, the 
plaintiffs challenged discriminatory admissions policies of private 
schools set up in the 1950s to avoid the mandate of Brown. No other 
federal civil rights law condemned the private discrimination. The 
Court's holding that section 1981 prohibits such discrimination is an 
important reaffirmation of the goal of guaranteeing equal educational 
opportunity.172 
It is, therefore, apparent that reading section 1981 (and section 
1982) to apply to private discrimination is fully consistent with the 
warp and woof of our current legal system and social norms condemn-
ing racial discrimination.173 A conclusion that such discrimination is 
not forbidden would leave significant gaps in civil rights protection 
and represent a marked step backward in the battle against racism. 
This is not to say that the Court is empowered to pass statutes to 
combat evils that Congress has left uncorrected. But when a statute is 
open to two interpretations, only one of which fits well within the 
overall scheme of our current laws, that interpretation ought to be 
preferred. 
Finally, recent congressional action seems predicated on the as-
sumption that the statute condemns private discrimination.174 Irre-
416-17 (1968) (enactment of Fair Housing Act of 1968 does not prevent application of§ 1982 to 
private discrimination in housing). 
171. Section 1981 claims have challenged discrimination in private schools, restaurants,· 
clubs, recreational facilities, housing, utility services, access to roads, insurance coverage, medi-
cal treatment, commercial ventures, franchise relationships, and banking transactions. See Brief 
Amici Curiae of the State of New York, et al, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (No. 87-107) 
at 17-18. 
172. Bob Jones University, of course, represents another battle in the long struggle to end 
discrimination in education. In words that are equally applicable in Runyon, the Court stated: 
"Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and however sincere the ra-
tionale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy." 461 U.S. 574, 
595 (1983). 
173. This point is stressed by a number of the amici briefs filed in Patterson. See, e.g .. Brief 
of 66 Members of the U.S. Senate and 118 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives at 5-7; 
Brief of American Jewish Congress at 18-20; Brief of the State of New York et al, at 8-21. 
174. See Brief for Petitioner on Reargument, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (No. 87-
107) at 71-100; Eskridge, supra note 93. 
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spective of arguments of "congressional ratification," such action 
helps define the legal fabric into which the Court must weave section 
1981. 
I have not said anything about original intent. While Justice 
White's dissent in Runyon convinced many that the majority's deci-
sion violated the intent of the enacting legislature, the brief for the 
petitioner on reargument makes White's analysis far less persuasive. 
Under my nautical approach, however, the Court need not be overly 
concerned about the historical debate. It might be interested that 
some legislators at the time thought the language covered private dis-
crimination; this finding would at least support the conclusion that the 
words of the statute can bear that meaning. But the Court would not 
have to decide whether a majority of the legislators thought the statute 
applied to private acts. 
These considerations would point towards the conclusion that, 
under a nautical approach, section 1981 ought to be read to prohibit 
private discrimination. When concerns of stare decisis are factored in, 
the case for maintaining Runyon becomes very strong indeed. 
* * * * 
"Better be prophetic than archaeological," Charles Curtis wrote. 
"[B]etter pay a decent respect for a future legislature than stand in awe 
of one that has folded up its papers and joined its friends at the coun-
try club or in the cemetery. Better that the courts should set their 
decisions up against the possibility of correction than make them the 
shadow of a fiction which amounts to a denial of any responsibility for 
the result."175 Justice Stevens assumed responsibility when he de-
clared in Runyon, that whether or not the Reconstruction Congress 
thought its legislation covered private discrimination, such an inter-
pretation "surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice 
today."176 
175. Curtis, supra note 10, at 415. Curtis continued: 
Let the courts deliberate on what the present or a future legislature would do after it had 
read the court's opinion, after the situation has been explained, after the court has exhibited 
the whole fabric of the law into which this particular bit of legislation had had to be ad-
justed. The legislature would then be acting, if it did act, in the light of the tradition of the 
whole of law, which is what the courts expound and still stand for. 
Id. at 415-16. 
176. 427 U.S. at 191. 
